Working Group:FAPI
Authors: Nat Sakimura
John Bradley
Edmund Jay
Date:July 10, 2024

FAPI security profile 1.0 - Part 2: Advanced with incorporated errata 1 (Draft) - 1

FAPI 1.0 security profile - part 2: Baseline is an OAuth profile that aims to provide specific implementation guidelines for security and interoperability. It provides highly secure options.


This document is not an OIDF International Standard. It is distributed for review and comment. It is subject to change without notice and may not be referred to as an International Standard.

Recipients of this draft are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation.

Table of contents


The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) promotes, protects and nurtures the OpenID community and technologies. As a non-profit international standardizing body, it is comprised by over 160 participating entities (workgroup participant). The work of preparing implementer drafts and final international standards is carried out through OIDF workgroups in accordance with the OpenID Process. Participants interested in a subject for which a workgroup has been established have the right to be represented in that workgroup. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with OIDF, also take part in the work. OIDF collaborates closely with other standardizing bodies in the related fields.

Final drafts adopted by the Workgroup through consensus are circulated publicly for the public review for 60 days and for the OIDF members for voting. Publication as an OIDF Standard requires approval by at least 50% of the members casting a vote. There is a possibility that some of the elements of this document may be subject to patent rights. OIDF shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

Notational Conventions

The keywords "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", and "can" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO Directive Part 2 [ISODIR2]. These keywords are not used as dictionary terms such that any occurrence of them shall be interpreted as keywords and are not to be interpreted with their natural language meanings. They are all in lower case to rule out the dictionary meaning use of these words so that they can be translated easily. Following is a summary of the keywords.

Kind Keywords
Requirement shall, shall not
Recommendation should, should not
Permission may
Possibility can, cannot

FAPI 1.0 consists of the following parts:

These parts are intended to be used with RFC6749, RFC6750, RFC7636, and OIDC.


FAPI is a highly secured OAuth profile that aims to provide specific implementation guidelines for security and interoperability. The FAPI security profile can be applied to APIs in any market area that requires a higher level of security than provided by standard OAuth or OpenID Connect. Among other security enhancements, this specification provides a secure alternative to screen scraping. Screen scraping accesses user’s data and functions by impersonating a user through password sharing. This brittle, inefficient, and insecure practice creates security vulnerabilities which require institutions to allow what appears to be an automated attack against their applications.

This document is Part 2 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 that specifies an advanced security profile of OAuth that is suitable to be used for protecting APIs with high inherent risk. Examples include APIs that give access to highly sensitive data or that can be used to trigger financial transactions (e.g., payment initiation). This document specifies the controls against attacks such as: authorization request tampering, authorization response tampering including code injection, state injection, and token request phishing. Additional details are available in the security considerations section.

Although it is possible to code an OpenID provider and relying party from first principles using this specification, the main audience for this specification is parties who already have a certified implementation of OpenID Connect and want to achieve a higher level of security. Implementers are encouraged to understand the security considerations contained in Section 8.7 before embarking on a ‘from scratch’ implementation.

1. Scope

This part of the document specifies the method of

This document is applicable to higher risk use cases which includes commercial and investment banking and other similar industries.

2. Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Part1 FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline

RFC6749 - The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework

RFC7636 - Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients

OIDC - OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1

RFC8705 - OAuth 2.0 Mutual TLS Client Authentication and Certificate Bound Access Tokens

JARM - JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)

PAR - OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests

JAR - OAuth 2.0 JWT Secured Authorization Request

3. Terms and definitions

For the purpose of this document, the terms defined in RFC6749, RFC6750, RFC7636, OpenID Connect Core and ISO29100 apply.

4. Symbols and abbreviated terms

API – Application Programming Interface

CSRF – Cross Site Request Forgery

DN – Distinguished Name

HTTP – Hyper Text Transfer Protocol

HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure

JAR – JWT-Secured Authorization Request

JARM – JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode

JOSE – Javascript Object Signing and Encryption

JSON – JavaScript Object Notation

JWE – JSON Web Encryption

JWK – JSON Web Key

JWKS – JSON Web Key Sets

JWS – JSON Web Signature

JWT – JSON Web Token

MTLS – Mutual Transport Layer Security

OIDF – OpenID Foundation

PAR – Pushed Authorization Requests

PII – Personally Identifiable Information

PKCE – Proof Key for Code Exchange

REST – Representational State Transfer

RP – Relying Party

TLS – Transport Layer Security

URI – Uniform Resource Identifier

URL – Uniform Resource Locator

5. Advanced security profile

5.1 Authorization response security

5.1.1 Introduction

The OIDF FAPI security profile specifies security requirements for high risk API resources protected by the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework that consists of RFC6749, RFC6750, RFC7636, and other specifications.

There are different levels of risks associated with access to these APIs. For example, read and write access to a bank API has a higher financial risk than read-only access. As such, the security profiles of the authorization framework protecting these APIs are also different.

This profile describes security provisions for the server and client that are appropriate for highly secured APIs by defining the measures to mitigate:

  • attacks that leverage the weak binding of endpoints in RFC6749 (e.g. malicious endpoint attacks, IdP mix-up attacks), and
  • attacks that modify authorization requests and responses unprotected in RFC6749.

This profile does not support public clients.

The following ways are specified to protect against modifications of authorization responses: Implementations can leverage OpenID Connect’s hybrid fow that returns an ID Token in the authorization response or they can utilize the JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM) that returns and protects all authorization response parameters in a JWT.

5.1.2 ID Token as detached signature

While the name ID Token (as used in the OpenID Connect hybrid flow) suggests that it is something that provides the identity of the resource owner (subject), it is not necessarily so. While it does identify the authorization server by including the issuer identifier, it is perfectly fine to have an ephemeral subject identifier. In this case, the ID Token acts as a detached signature of the issuer to the authorization response and it was an explicit design decision of OpenID Connect Core to make the ID Token act as a detached signature.

This document leverages this fact and protects the authorization response by including the hash of all of the unprotected response parameters, e.g. code and state, in the ID Token.

While the hash of the code is defined in OIDC, the hash of the state is not defined. Thus this document defines it as follows.


State hash value. Its value is the base64url encoding of the left-most half of the hash of the octets of the ASCII representation of the state value, where the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm used in the alg header parameter of the ID Token’s JOSE header. For instance, if the alg is HS512, hash the state value with SHA-512, then take the left-most 256 bits and base64url encode them. The s_hash value is a case sensitive string.

5.1.3 JWT secured authorization response mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)

An authorization server may protect authorization responses to clients using the “JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode” JARM.

JARM allows a client to request that an authorization server encodes the authorization response (of any response type) in a JWT. It is an alternative to utilizing ID Tokens as detached signatures for providing increased security on authorization responses and can be used with plain OAuth.

This specification facilitates use of JARM in conjunction with the response type code.

NOTE: JARM can be used to protect OpenID Connect authentication responses. In this case, the OpenID RP would use response type code, response mode jwt and scope openid. This means JARM protects the authentication response (instead of the ID Token) and the ID Token containing end-user claims is obtained from the token endpoint. This facilitates privacy since no end-user claims are sent through the front channel. It also provides decoupling of message protection and identity providing since a client (or RP) can basically use JARM to protect all authorization responses and turn on OpenID if needed (e.g. to log the user in).

5.2 Advanced security provisions

5.2.1 Introduction

API resources may contain sensitive data and/or have increased security requirements. In order to fulfill different security needs, FAPI Security Profile 1.0 defines an advanced profile that is beyond the baseline security requirements defined in the Part 1: Baseline document.

As a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, this document mandates the following for the advanced profile of the FAPI Security Profile 1.0.

5.2.2 Authorization server

The authorization server shall support the provisions specified in clause 5.2.2 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline, with the exception that Section 5.2.2-7 (enforcement of RFC7636) is not required.

In addition, the authorization server

  1. shall require a JWS signed JWT request object passed by value with the request parameter or by reference with the request_uri parameter;
  2. shall require
    1. the response_type value code id_token, or
    2. the response_type value code in conjunction with the response_mode value jwt;
  3. (moved to;
  4. (moved to;
  5. shall only issue sender-constrained access tokens;
  6. shall support RFC8705 as mechanism for constraining the legitimate senders of access tokens;
  7. (withdrawn);
  8. (moved to;
  9. (moved to;
  10. shall only use the parameters included in the signed request object passed via the request or request_uri parameter;
  11. may support the pushed authorization request endpoint as described in PAR;
  12. (withdrawn);
  13. shall require the request object to contain an exp claim that has a lifetime of no longer than 60 minutes after the nbf claim;
  14. shall authenticate the confidential client using one of the following methods (this overrides FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline clause 5.2.2-4):
    1. tls_client_auth or self_signed_tls_client_auth as specified in section 2 of RFC8705, or
    2. private_key_jwt as specified in section 9 of OIDC;
  15. shall require the aud claim in the request object to be, or to be an array containing, the authorization server’s issuer identifier URL;
  16. shall not support public clients;
  17. shall require the request object to contain an nbf claim that is no longer than 60 minutes in the past; and
  18. shall require PAR requests, if supported, to use PKCE (RFC7636) with S256 as the code challenge method.

NOTE: MTLS is currently the only mechanism for sender-constrained access tokens that has been widely deployed. Future versions of this specification are likely to allow other mechanisms for sender-constrained access tokens.

NOTE: PAR does not present any additional security concerns that necessitated the requirement to use PKCE - the reason PKCE is not required in other cases is merely to be backwards compatible with earlier drafts of this standard. ID Token as detached signature

In addition, if the response_type value code id_token is used, the authorization server

  1. shall support OIDC;
  2. shall support signed ID Tokens;
  3. should support signed and encrypted ID Tokens;
  4. shall return ID Token as a detached signature to the authorization response;
  5. shall include state hash, s_hash, in the ID Token to protect the state value if the client supplied a value for state. s_hash may be omitted from the ID Token returned from the token endpoint when s_hash is present in the ID Token returned from the authorization endpoint; and
  6. should not return sensitive PII in the ID Token in the authorization response, but if it needs to, then it should encrypt the ID Token.

NOTE: The authorization server may return more claims in the ID Token from the token endpoint than in the one from the authorization response JARM

In addition, if the response_type value code is used in conjunction with the response_mode value jwt, the authorization server

  1. shall create JWT-secured authorization responses as specified in JARM, Section 4.3.

5.2.3 Confidential client

A confidential client shall support the provisions specified in clause 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline, except for RFC7636 support.

In addition, the confidential client

  1. shall support RFC8705 as mechanism for sender-constrained access tokens;
  2. shall include the request or request_uri parameter as defined in Section 6 of OIDC in the authentication request;
  3. shall ensure the authorization server has authenticated the user to an appropriate level of assurance for the client’s intended purpose;
  4. (moved to;
  5. (withdrawn);
  6. (withdrawn);
  7. (moved;
  8. shall send all parameters inside the authorization request’s signed request object;
  9. shall additionally send duplicates of the response_type, client_id, and scope parameters/values using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax as required by Section 6.1 of the OpenID Connect specification if not using PAR;
  10. shall send the aud claim in the request object as the authorization server’s issuer identifier URL;
  11. shall send an exp claim in the request object that has a lifetime of no longer than 60 minutes;
  12. (moved to;
  13. (moved to;
  14. shall send a nbf claim in the request object;
  15. shall use RFC7636 with S256 as the code challenge method if using PAR; and
  16. shall additionally send a duplicate of the client_id parameter/value using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax to the authorization endpoint, as required by Section 5 of JAR, if using PAR. ID Token as detached signature

In addition, if the response_type value code id_token is used, the client

  1. shall include the value openid into the scope parameter in order to activate OIDC support;
  2. shall require JWS signed ID Token be returned from endpoints;
  3. shall verify that the authorization response was not tampered using ID Token as the detached signature;
  4. shall verify that s_hash value is equal to the value calculated from the state value in the authorization response in addition to all the requirements in of OIDC; and NOTE: This enables the client to verify that the authorization response was not tampered with, using the ID Token as a detached signature.
  5. shall support both signed and signed & encrypted ID Tokens. JARM

In addition, if the response_type value code is used in conjunction with the response_mode value jwt, the client

  1. shall verify the authorization responses as specified in JARM, Section 4.4.

6. Accessing protected resources (using tokens)

6.1 Introduction

The FAPI endpoints are OAuth 2.0 protected resource endpoints that return protected information for the resource owner associated with the submitted access token.

6.2 Advanced access provisions

6.2.1 Protected resources provisions

The protected resources supporting this document

  1. shall support the provisions specified in clause 6.2.1 FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline; and
  2. shall adhere to the requirements in RFC8705.

6.2.2 Client provisions

The client supporting this document shall support the provisions specified in clause 6.2.2 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline.

7. (Withdrawn)

8. Security considerations

8.1 Introduction

As a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, this specification references the security considerations defined in Section 10 of RFC6749, as well as RFC6819 - OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations, which details various threats and mitigations. The security of OAuth 2.0 has been proven formally - under certain assumptions - in OAUTHSEC. A detailed security analysis of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 can be found in FAPISEC.

8.2 Uncertainty of resource server handling of access tokens

There is no way that the client can find out whether the resource access was granted for a bearer or sender-constrained access token. The two differ in the risk profile and the client may want to differentiate them. The protected resources that conform to this document differentiate them. The protected resources that conform to this document shall not accept a bearer access token. They shall only support sender-constrained access tokens via RFC8705.

8.3 Attacks using weak binding of authorization server endpoints

8.3.1 Introduction

In RFC6749 and RFC6750, the endpoints that the authorization server offers are not tightly bound together. There is no notion of authorization server identifier (issuer identifier) and it is not indicated in the authorization response unless the client uses different redirection URI per authorization server. While it is assumed in the OAuth model, it is not explicitly spelled out and thus many clients use the same redirection URI for different authorization servers exposing an attack surface. Several attacks have been identified and the threats are explained in detail in RFC6819.

8.3.2 Client credential and authorization code phishing at token endpoint

In this attack, the client developer is socially engineered into believing that the token endpoint has changed to the URL that is controlled by the attacker. As a result, the client sends the code and the client secret to the attacker, which the attacker can then replay.

When the FAPI Security Profile 1.0 client uses RFC8705, the client’s secret (the private key corresponding to its TLS certificate) is not exposed to the attacker, which therefore cannot authenticate towards the token endpoint of the authorization server. However, there is still the potential for a phished code be injected into a different flow involving an honest client.

8.3.3 Identity provider (IdP) mix-up attack

In this attack, the client has registered multiple IdPs and one of them is a rogue IdP that returns the same client_id that belongs to one of the honest IdPs. When a user clicks on a malicious link or visits a compromised site, an authorization request is sent to the rogue IdP. The rogue IdP then redirects the client to the honest IdP that has the same client_id. If the user is already logged on at the honest IdP, then the authentication may be skipped and a code is generated and returned to the client. Since the client was interacting with the rogue IdP, the code is sent to the rogue IdP’s token endpoint. At the point, the attacker has a valid code that can be exchanged for an access token at the honest IdP. See OAUTHSEC for a detailed description of the attack.

This attack is mitigated by the use of OpenID Connect hybrid flow in which the honest IdP’s issuer identifier is included as the value of iss or JARM where the iss included in the response JWT. On receiving the authorization response, the client compares the iss value from the response with the issuer URL of the IdP it sent the authorization request to (the rogue IdP). The client detects the conflicting issuer values and aborts the transaction.

8.3.4 Access token phishing

Various mechanisms in this specification aim at preventing access token phishing, e.g., the requirement of exactly matching redirect URIs and the restriction on response types that do not return access tokens in the front channel. As a second layer of defense, FAPI Security Profile 1.0 advanced clients use RFC8705 meaning the access token is bound to the client’s TLS certificate. Even if an access token is phished, it cannot be used by the attacker. An attacker could try to trick a client under his control to make use of the access token as described in FAPISEC (“Cuckoo’s Token Attack” and “Access Token Injection with ID Token Replay”), but these attacks additionally require a rogue authorization server or misconfigured token endpoint.

For the “Access Token Injection with ID Token Replay” attack, the attacker tricks a client under his control to start a normal authorization flow to obtain an authorization response with an ID Token. The ID Token is replayed along with a phished access token at the token endpoint (which is misconfigured in the client to point to an attacker-controlled URL). The attacker then gains access to resources of the honest resource owner through the client.

Misconfigured endpoints are mitigated by using metadata in the authorization server’s published metadata document as defined in OIDD or RFC8414.

ID Token replay can be mitigated by requiring the at_hash in the token endpoint’s ID Token response to verify the validity of the access token.

8.4 Attacks that modify authorization requests and responses

8.4.1 Introduction

In RFC6749 the authorization request and responses are not integrity protected. Thus, an attacker can modify them.

8.4.2 Authorization request parameter injection attack

In RFC6749, the authorization request is sent as a query parameter. Although RFC6749 mandates the use of TLS, the TLS is terminated in the browser and thus not protected within the browser; as a result an attacker can tamper the authorization request and insert any parameter values.

The use of a request object or request_uri in the authorization request will prevent tampering with the request parameters.

The IdP confusion attack reported in SoK: Single Sign-On Security – An Evaluation of OpenID Connect is an example of this kind of attack.

8.4.3 Authorization response parameter injection attack

This attack occurs when the victim and attacker use the same relying party client. The attacker is somehow able to capture the authorization code and state from the victim’s authorization response and uses them in his own authorization response.

This can be mitigated by using OpenID Connect hybrid flow where the c_hash, at_hash, and s_hash can be used to verify the validity of the authorization code, access token, and state parameters. It can also be mitigated using JARM by verifying the integrity of the authorization response JWT.

The server can verify that the state is the same as what was stored in the browser session at the time of the authorization request.

8.5 TLS considerations

As confidential information is being exchanged, all interactions shall be encrypted with TLS (HTTPS).

Section 7.1 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline shall apply, with the following additional requirements:

  1. For TLS versions below 1.3, only the following 4 cipher suites shall be permitted:
  2. For the authorization_endpoint, the authorization server MAY allow additional cipher suites that are permitted by the latest version of BCP195, if necessary to allow sufficient interoperability with users’ web browsers or are required by local regulations. NOTE: Permitted cipher suites are those that BCP195 does not explicity say MUST NOT use.
  3. When using the TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 cipher suites, key lengths of at least 2048 bits are required.

8.6 Algorithm considerations

For JWS, both clients and authorization servers

  1. shall use PS256 or ES256 algorithms;
  2. should not use algorithms that use RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (e.g. RS256); and
  3. shall not use none.

8.6.1 Encryption algorithm considerations

For JWE, both clients and authorization servers

  1. shall not use the RSA1_5 algorithm.

8.7 Incomplete or incorrect implementations of the specifications

To achieve the full security benefits, it is important the implementation of this specification, and the underlying OpenID Connect and OAuth specifications, are both complete and correct.

The OpenID Foundation provides tools that can be used to confirm that an implementation is correct:

The OpenID Foundation maintains a list of certified implementations:

Deployments that use this specification should use a certified implementation.

8.8 Session fixation

An attacker could prepare an authorization request URL and trick a victim into authorizing access to the requested resources, e.g. by sending the URL via e-Mail or utilizing it on a fake site.

OAuth 2.0 prevents this kind of attack since the process for obtaining the access token (code exchange, CSRF protection etc.) is designed in a way that the attacker will be unable to obtain and use the token as long as it does not control the victim’s browser.

However, if the API allows execution of any privileged action in the course of the authorization process before the access token is issued, these controls are rendered ineffective. Implementers of this specification therefore shall ensure any action is executed using the access token issued by the authorization process.

For example, payments shall not be executed in the authorization process but after the client has exchanged the authorization code for a token and sent an “execute payment” request with the access token to a protected endpoint.


This profile requires both clients and authorization servers to verify payloads with keys from the other party. The authorization server verifies request objects and private_key_jwt assertions. The client verifies ID Tokens and authorization response JWTs. For authorization servers, this profile strongly recommends the use of JWKS URI endpoints to distribute public keys. For clients this profile recommends either the use of JWKS URI endpoints or the use of the jwks parameter in combination with RFC7591 and RFC7592.

The definition of the authorization server jwks_uri can be found in RFC8414, while the definition of the client jwks_uri can be found in RFC7591.

In addition, this profile

  1. requires that jwks_uri endpoints shall be served over TLS;
  2. recommends that JOSE headers for x5u and jku should not be used; and
  3. recommends that the JWK set does not contain multiple keys with the same kid.

8.10 Multiple clients sharing the same key

The use of RFC8705 for client authentication and sender constraining access tokens brings significant security benefits over the use of shared secrets. However in some deployments the certificates used for RFC8705 are issued by a certificate authority at an organization level rather than a client level. In such situations it may be common for an organization with multiple clients to use the same certificates (or certificates with the same DN) across clients. Implementers should be aware that such sharing means that a compromise of any one client, would result in a compromise of all clients sharing the same key.

8.11 Duplicate key identifiers

JWK sets should not contain multiple keys with the same kid. However, to increase interoperability when there are multiple keys with the same kid, the verifier shall consider other JWK attributes, such as kty, use, alg, etc., when selecting the verification key for the particular JWS message. For example, the following algorithm could be used in selecting which key to use to verify a message signature:

  1. find keys with a kid that matches the kid in the JOSE header;
  2. if a single key is found, use that key;
  3. if multiple keys are found, then the verifier should iterate through the keys until a key is found that has a matching alg, use, kty, or crv that corresponds to the message being verified.

9. Privacy considerations

9.1 Introduction

There are many factors to be considered in terms of privacy when implementing this document. However, since this document is a profile of OAuth and OpenID Connect, all of them are generic and applies to OAuth or OpenID Connect and not specific to this document. Implementers are advised to perform a thorough privacy impact assessment and manage identified risks appropriately.

NOTE: Implementers can consult documents like ISO29100 and [ISO29134] for this purpose.

Privacy threats to OAuth and OpenID Connect implementations include the following:

These can be mitigated by choosing appropriate options in OAuth or OpenID, or by introducing some operational rules. For example, “Attacker observing personal data in authorization request” can be mitigated by either using authorization request by reference using request_uri or by encrypting the request object. Similarly, “Attacker observing personal data in authorization endpoint response” can be mitigated by encrypting the ID Token or JARM response.

10. Acknowledgement

The following people contributed to this document:

11. Bibliography

12. IANA considerations

12.1 Additions to JWT claims registry

This specification adds the following values to the “JSON Web Token Claims” registry established by RFC7519.

12.1.1. Registry contents

  • Claim name: s_hash
  • Claim Description: State hash value
  • Change Controller: OpenID Foundation FAPI Working Group -
  • Reference: Section 5 of [[ this specification ]]

Appendix A. Examples

The following are non-normative examples of various objects compliant with this specification, with line wraps within values for display purposes only.

The examples signed by the client may be verified with the following JWK:

      "kty": "RSA",
      "e": "AQAB",
      "use": "sig",
      "kid": "client-2020-08-28",
      "alg": "PS256",
      "n": "i0Ybm4TJyErnD5FIs-6sgAdtP6fG631FXbe5gcOGYgn9aC2BS2h9Ah5cRGQpr3aLLVKCRWU6

The examples signed by the server may be verified with the following JWK:

      "kty": "RSA",
      "e": "AQAB",
      "use": "sig",
      "kid": "server-2020-08-28",
      "alg": "PS256",
      "n": "pz6g0h7Cu63SHE8_Ib4l3hft8XuptZ-Or7v_j1EkCboyAEn_ZCuBrQOmpUIoPKrA0JNWK_fF

A.1 Example request object


which when decoded has the following body:

      "aud": "",
      "nbf": 1594140030,
      "scope": "openid payments",
      "iss": "52480754053",
      "response_type": "code id_token",
      "redirect_uri": "",
      "state": "VgSUIEnflnDxTe1vAtr54o",
      "exp": 1594140390,
      "nonce": "7xDCHviuPMSXJIigkHOcDi",
      "client_id": "52480754053"

A.2 Example signed id_token for authorization endpoint response


which when decoded has the following body:

      "sub": "1001",
      "aud": "52480754053",
      "c_hash": "QR2zucfYZkiLrbKBKDVpgQ",
      "s_hash": "9s6CBbOxiKE65d9-Qr0QIQ",
      "auth_time": 1594140090,
      "iss": "",
      "exp": 1594140390,
      "iat": 1594140090,
      "nonce": "7xDCHviuPMSXJIigkHOcDi"

A.3 Example signed and encrypted id_token for authorization endpoint response


which when decrypted using the following key:

        "kty": "RSA",
        "d": "OjDe8EkZXgvB-Gy5A4EdU8fBuAjdHLMyHKAtMaS_W_joEJHDvZRhIYbh1jAyHYoR3kFMXu
        "e": "AQAB",
        "use": "enc",
        "kid": "client-enc-2020-08-28",
        "n": "jVc92j0ntTV0V1nwZ3mpGaV2bME4d6AMS2SRrJBM0fLehaTEqDNzGu0warz2SC9bhcBOB5

has the following body:

      "sub": "1001",
      "aud": "2334382354153498",
      "acr": "",
      "c_hash": "BLfy9hvQUZTDq6_KmF4kDQ",
      "s_hash": "9s6CBbOxiKE65d9-Qr0QIQ",
      "auth_time": 1595827190,
      "iss": "",
      "exp": 1595827490,
      "iat": 1595827190,
      "nonce": "7xDCHviuPMSXJIigkHOcDi"

A.4 Example JARM response


which when decoded has the following body:

      "aud": "469180648039051",
      "code": "zwkGac9juLX8F8frapDISi3K2Fwln4qxwyfNII3Cjz0",
      "iss": "",
      "state": "VgSUIEnflnDxTe1vAtr54o",
      "exp": 1594141090

A.5 Example private_key_jwt client assertion


which when decoded has the following body:

      "sub": "52480754053",
      "aud": "",
      "iss": "52480754053",
      "exp": 1594140151,
      "iat": 1594140091,
      "jti": "4vBctMSkK4wfuOui9Cyc"

Appendix B Changes


Copyright (c) 2023 The OpenID Foundation.

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Author's Addresses

Nat Sakimura
John Bradley
Edmund Jay