fapi-2-http-signatures December 2024
Tonge, et al. Standards Track [Page]
Workgroup:
fapi
Published:
Authors:
D. Tonge
Moneyhub Financial Technology
D. Fett
Authlete
J. Heenan
Authlete

FAPI 2.0 Http Signatures (Draft)

Foreword

The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) promotes, protects and nurtures the OpenID community and technologies. As a non-profit international standardizing body, it is comprised by over 160 participating entities (workgroup participant). The work of preparing implementer drafts and final international standards is carried out through OIDF workgroups in accordance with the OpenID Process. Participants interested in a subject for which a workgroup has been established have the right to be represented in that workgroup. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with OIDF, also take part in the work. OIDF collaborates closely with other standardizing bodies in the related fields.

Final drafts adopted by the Workgroup through consensus are circulated publicly for the public review for 60 days and for the OIDF members for voting. Publication as an OIDF Standard requires approval by at least 50% of the members casting a vote. There is a possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject to patent rights. OIDF shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

Introduction

OIDF FAPI 2.0 is an API security profile based on the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749]. This HTTP Signature Profile is part of the FAPI 2.0 family of specifications with a focus on providing interoperable support for non-repudiation across HTTP requests and responses.

Warning

This document is not an OIDF International Standard. It is distributed for review and comment. It is subject to change without notice and may not be referred to as an International Standard.

Recipients of this draft are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation.

Notational conventions

The keywords "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", and "can" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO Directive Part 2 [ISODIR2]. These keywords are not used as dictionary terms such that any occurrence of them shall be interpreted as keywords and are not to be interpreted with their natural language meanings.

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Table of Contents

1. Scope

This document specifies the methods for clients, authorization servers and resource servers to sign and verify messages.

2. Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

See Clause 8 for normative references.

3. Terms and definitions

For the purpose of this document, the terms defined in [RFC6749], [RFC6750], [RFC7636], [OIDC] and [ISO29100] apply.

4. Symbols and Abbreviated terms

API – Application Programming Interface

HTTP – Hyper Text Transfer Protocol

JAR – JWT-Secured Authorization Request

JARM – JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode

JWT – JSON Web Token

JSON – JavaScript Object Notation

OIDF – OpenID Foundation

PAR – Pushed Authorization Requests

PKCE – Proof Key for Code Exchange

REST – Representational State Transfer

TLS – Transport Layer Security

URI – Uniform Resource Identifier

URL – Uniform Resource Locator

5. HTTP signature profile

OIDF FAPI 2.0 is an API security profile based on the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749]. This HTTP signature profile aims to reach the security goals laid out in the Attacker Model [attackermodel] plus the non-repudiation goals listed below.

TODO: Add in reference to Message Signing spec

5.1. Profile

In addition to the technologies used in the [FAPI2_Security_Profile_ID2], the following standards are used in this profile:

  • HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421] and Digest Fields [RFC9530] for signing HTTP requests to and responses from resource servers.

5.2. Non-repudiation

Beyond what is captured by the security goals and the attacker model in [attackermodel], parties could try to deny having sent a particular message, for example, a payment request. For this purpose, non-repudiation is needed.

In the context of this specification, non-repudiation refers to the assurance that the owner of a signature key pair that was capable of generating an existing signature corresponding to certain data cannot convincingly deny having signed the data ([NIST.SP.800-133]).

This is usually achieved by providing application-level signatures that can be stored together with the payload and meaningful metadata of a request or response.

The following messages are affected by this specification:

  • NR5: resource requests
  • NR6: resource responses

5.3. HTTP message signing

To support non-repudiation for NR5 and NR6, HTTP requests, responses, or both can be signed.

5.3.1. Requirements for signing and verifying resource requests

5.3.1.1. Clients

Clients sending signed resource requests act in the role of "signer" as defined by [RFC9421]. This signer

  1. shall create an HTTP message signature as described in [RFC9421];
  2. shall include @method (the method used in the HTTP request) in the signature;
  3. shall include @target-uri (the full request URI of the HTTP request) in the signature;
  4. shall include the created parameter (the signature creation time) in the signature;
  5. shall include the tag parameter with a value of fapi-2-request in the signature;
  6. shall include the Authorization header in the signature;
  7. when DPoP [RFC9449] is in use, shall include the DPoP header in the signature;
  8. when the message contains a request body, shall include the content-digest header as defined in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-digest-headers] in the request, shall include that header in the signature, and should use content-encoding agnostic digest methods (such as sha-256).
5.3.1.2. Resource servers

Resource servers receiving signed resource requests act in the role of "verifier" as defined by [RFC9421]. This verifier

  1. shall retrieve the valid public key for the client;
  2. shall verify the signature received from the client as described in [RFC9421];
  3. shall reject requests with missing or invalid signatures using HTTP status code 401;
  4. shall reject requests which don't have a tag parameter with the value of fapi-2-request in the signature;
  5. shall reject requests with signatures that are missing @method, @target-uri, or Authorization in the signature;
  6. shall reject requests with signatures that are missing the created parameter or have a created value that is greater than an acceptable range (1 minute is recommended);
  7. when a DPoP header is present in the request, shall reject requests that are missing DPoP in the signature;
  8. when the request contains a request body, shall reject requests that are missing content-digest in the signature.

NOTE: This specification doesn't specify the exact means by which a resource server can retrieve the key for the client. The resource server can obtain an identifier for the client either from a mutual TLS cerficiate or from a JWT access token or from a token introspection response. With a client identifier and the keyid in the Signature-Input field, the resource server can retrieve the key from a trusted third party or by some other means.

5.3.2. Requirements for signing and verifying resource responses

5.3.2.1. Resource servers

Resource servers responding with a signed resource response act in the role of "signer" as defined by [RFC9421]. This signer

  1. shall create an HTTP message signature for the response as described in [RFC9421];
  2. shall cryptographically link the response to the request by including the request method, request target-uri and (if applicable) the request content-digest in the response signature input by means of the req boolean flag defined in Section 2.4 of [RFC9421];
  3. if the request was signed, shall include the request signature and request signature input in the response signature input by means of the req boolean flag defined in Section 2.4 of [RFC9421];
  4. shall include @status (the status code of the response) in the signature;
  5. shall include the created parameter (the signature creation time) in the signature;
  6. shall include the tag parameter with a value of fapi-2-response in the signature;
  7. when the response contains a response body, shall include the content-digest header as defined in [RFC9530] in the response, and shall include that header in the signature, and should use content-encoding agnostic digest methods (such as sha-256).

NOTE: In order to cryptographically link a response to a signed request, it is not sufficient to sign only the request signature value. Instead, the server has to sign all portions of the request relevant to generating the response by using the req feature of the HTTP message signature generation. This specification mandates a minimum coverage, but signers are required to sign anything else relevant to the API being protected, including headers and contents.

5.3.2.2. Clients

Clients receiving signed resource responses act in the role of "verifier" as defined by [RFC9421]. This verifier

  1. shall retrieve the valid public key for the resource server;
  2. shall accept and verify the signature in the response as described in [RFC9421];
  3. shall verify that @status and created are included in the signature;
  4. if the response contains a body, shall verify that content-digest is in the signature; and
  5. shall verify that the signature contains the tag parameter with a value of fapi-2-response.

NOTE: This specification doesn't specify the exact means by which a client can retrieve the key for the resource server. Together with the identity of the resource server and the keyid in the Signature-Input field, the client can retrieve the key from a trusted third party or by some other means.

NOTE: As noted in Section 2.4 of [RFC9421], the client will need to keep data related to the request in order to verify the response signature.

6. Security considerations

6.1. Difficulty in linking a signed message to a real world identity

This specification provides the technical means to sign messages, however proving that a specific signed response is linked to a specific real world end-user, or that a real world end-user initiated a specific request is outside of the scope of this document.

7. Privacy considerations

In addition to the privacy considerations detailed in [FAPI2_Security_Profile_ID2] implementers should consider the privacy implications of storing messages for the purpose of non-repudiation.

Such messages may well contain personally identifiable information and implementers should evaluate whether such messages need to be stored. If they are stored then adequate access controls must be put in place to protect that data. Such controls should follow data minimisation principles and ensure that there are tamper-proof audit logs.

8. Acknowledgements

This specification was developed by the OpenID FAPI Working Group.

We would like to thank Takahiko Kawasaki, Filip Skokan, Nat Sakimura, Dima Postnikov, Brian Campbell, Ralph Bragg, Justin Richer and Lukasz Jaromin for their valuable feedback and contributions that helped to evolve this specification.

9. Normative References

[FAPI2_Security_Profile_ID2]
Fett, D., "FAPI 2.0 Security Profile", , <https://openid.net/specs/fapi-2_0-security-profile-ID2.html>.
[ISO29100]
ISO/IEC, "ISO/IEC 29100 Information technology – Security techniques – Privacy framework", <https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html#:~:text=IEC%2029100%3A2011-,EN,-%2D%20FR>.
[NIST.SP.800-133]
Barker, E. and A. Roginsky, "NIST Special Publication 800-133", , <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133.pdf>.
[OIDC]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", , <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750]
Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7636]
Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636, DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.
[RFC9421]
Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
[RFC9530]
Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", RFC 9530, DOI 10.17487/RFC9530, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9530>.
[attackermodel]
Fett, D., "FAPI 2.0 Attacker Model", , <https://openid.net/specs/fapi-2_0-attacker-model-ID2.html>.

10. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-httpbis-digest-headers]
Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-13, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-13>.
[ISODIR2]
ISO/IEC, "ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 - Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents", <https://www.iso.org/sites/directives/current/part2/index.xhtml>.

Appendix A. Notices

Copyright (c) 2024 The OpenID Foundation.

The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.

The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

Authors' Addresses

Dave Tonge
Moneyhub Financial Technology
Daniel Fett
Authlete
Joseph Heenan
Authlete