| openid-connect-4-identity-assurance-1_0 | April 2024 | |
| Lodderstedt, et al. | Standards Track | [Page] |
This specification defines an extension of OpenID Connect for providing relying parties with verified claims about end-users. This extension facilitates the verification of the identity of a natural person.¶
The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) promotes, protects, and nurtures the OpenID community and technologies. As a non-profit international standardizing body, it is comprised by over 160 participating entities (workgroup participant). The work of preparing implementer drafts and final international standards is carried out through OIDF workgroups in accordance with the OpenID Process. Participants interested in a subject for which a workgroup has been established have the right to be represented in that workgroup. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with OIDF, also take part in the work. OIDF collaborates closely with other standardizing bodies in the related fields.¶
Final drafts adopted by the Workgroup through consensus are circulated publicly for the public review for 60 days and for the OIDF members for voting. Publication as an OIDF Standard requires approval by at least 50% of the members casting a vote. There is a possibility that some of the elements of this document may be subject to patent rights. OIDF shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.¶
This specification defines an extension to OpenID Connect [OpenID] for providing relying parties with identity information, i.e., verified claims, along with an explicit statement about the verification status of these claims (what, how, when, according to what rules, using what evidence). This specification is aimed at enabling use cases requiring strong assurance, for example, to comply with regulatory requirements such as anti-money laundering laws or access to health data, risk mitigation, or fraud prevention.¶
In such use cases, the relying party (RP) needs to understand the trustworthiness or assurance level of the claims about the end-user that the OpenID Connect provider (OP) is willing to communicate, along with process-related information and evidence used to verify the end-user claims.¶
The acr claim, as defined in section 2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID], is suited to assure information about the authentication performed in an OpenID Connect transaction. Identity assurance, however, requires a different representation. While authentication is an aspect of an OpenID Connect transaction, assurance is a property of a certain claim or a group of claims. Several of them will typically be conveyed to the RP as the result of an OpenID Connect transaction.¶
For example, the assurance an OP typically will be able to give for an e-mail address will be “self-asserted” or “verified by opt-in or similar mechanism”. The family name of an end-user, in contrast, might have been verified in accordance with the respective anti-money laundering law by showing an ID card to a trained employee of the OP operator.¶
Identity assurance therefore requires a way to convey assurance data along with and coupled to the respective claims about the end-user. This specification defines a suitable representation and mechanisms the RP will utilize to request verified claims about an end-user along with assurance data and for the OP to represent these verified claims and accompanying assurance data.¶
Note: This specifications fulfills the criteria for portability and interoperability mechanisms of Digital ID systems as defined in [FATF-Digital-Identity].¶
This document is not an OIDF International Standard. It is distributed for review and comment. It is subject to change without notice and may not be referred to as an International Standard.¶
Recipients of this draft are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation.¶
The keywords "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", and "can" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO Directive Part 2 [ISODIR2]. These keywords are not used as dictionary terms such that any occurrence of them shall be interpreted as keywords and are not to be interpreted with their natural language meanings.¶
This specification defines the technical mechanisms to allow relying parties to request verified claims and to enable OpenID providers to provide relying parties with verified claims ("the tools").¶
Additional facets needed to deploy a complete solution for identity assurance, such as legal aspects (including liability), trust frameworks, or commercial agreements are out of scope. It is up to the particular deployment to complement the technical solution based on this specification with the respective definitions ("the rules").¶
Note: Although such aspects are out of scope, the aim of the specification is to enable implementations of the technical mechanism to be flexible enough to fulfill different legal and commercial requirements in jurisdictions around the world. Consequently, such requirements will be discussed in this specification as examples.¶
See section 13 for normative references.¶
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.¶
process in which an end-user provides evidence to an OP or claim provider reliably identifying themselves, thereby allowing the OP or claim provider to assert that identification at a useful assurance level¶
process conducted by the OP or a claim provider to verify the end-user's identity¶
process in which the OP or a claim provider asserts identity data of a certain end-user with a certain assurance towards an RP, typically expressed by way of an assurance level. Depending on legal requirements, the OP can be required to provide evidence of the identity verification process to the RP¶
claims about an end-user, typically a natural person, whose binding to a particular end-user account was verified in the course of an identity verification process¶
The RP will be able to request the minimal data set it needs (data minimization) and to express requirements regarding this data, the evidence and the identity verification processes employed by the OP.¶
This extension will be usable by OPs operating under a certain regulation related to identity assurance, such as eIDAS, as well as other OPs operating without such a regulation.¶
It is assumed that OPs operating under a suitable regulation can assure identity data without the need to provide further evidence since they are approved to operate according to well-defined rules with clearly defined liability. For example in the case of eIDAS, the peer review ensures eIDAS compliance and the respective member state assumes the liability for the identities asserted by its notified eID systems.¶
Every other OP not operating under such well-defined conditions could receive a request to provide the RP data about the identity verification process along with identity evidence to allow the RP to conduct their own risk assessment and to map the data obtained from the OP to other laws. For example, if an OP verifies and maintains identity data in accordance with an anti-money laundering law, it shall be possible for an RP to use the respective identity in a different regulatory context, such as eHealth or the previously mentioned eIDAS.¶
The concept of this specification is that the OP can provide identity data along with metadata about the identity assurance process. It is the responsibility of the RP to assess this data and map it into its own legal context.¶
From a technical perspective, this means this specification allows the OP to provide verified claims along with information about the respective trust framework, but also supports the externalization of information about the identity verification process.¶
The representation defined in this specification can be used to provide RPs with verified claims about the end-user via any appropriate channel. In the context of OpenID Connect, verified claims can be provided in ID Tokens or as part of the UserInfo response. It is also possible to utilize the format described here in OAuth access tokens or token introspection responses to provide resource servers with verified claims.¶
This extension is intended to be truly international and support identity assurance across different jurisdictions. The extension is therefore extensible to support various trust frameworks, identity evidence and assurance processes.¶
In order to give implementors as much flexibility as possible, this extension can be used in conjunction with existing OpenID Connect claims and other extensions within the same OpenID Connect assertion (e.g., ID Token or UserInfo response) utilized to convey claims about end-users.¶
For example, OpenID Connect [OpenID] defines claims for representing family name and given name of an end-user without a verification status. These claims can be used in the same OpenID Connect assertion beside verified claims represented according to this extension.¶
In the same way, existing claims to inform the RP of the verification status of the phone_number and email claims can be used together with this extension.¶
Even for representing verified claims, this extension utilizes existing OpenID Connect claims if possible and reasonable. The extension will, however, ensure RPs cannot (accidentally) interpret unverified claims as verified claims.¶
In order to fulfill the requirements of some jurisdictions on identity assurance, the OpenID Connect for IDA claims [OpenID4IDAClaims] specification defines the a number of claims for conveying end-user data in addition to the claims defined in the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].¶
The basic idea is to use a container element, called verified_claims, to provide the RP with a set of claims along with the respective metadata and verification evidence related to the verification of these claims. This way, it is explicit which claims are verified, reducing the risk of RPs accidentally processing unverified claims as verified claims.¶
This specification uses the [!@IDA-verified-claims] document as the definition of the schema for representation of assured digital identity attributes and identity assurance metadata.¶
The following example would assert to the RP that the OP has verified the claims provided (given_name and family_name) according to an example trust framework trust_framework_example:¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "trust_framework_example"
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Meier"
}
}
}
¶
This specification requires that the schema defined in [IDA-verified-claims] shall be used. There are places in the JSON structure where that schema can be extended by implementers but deviation from the schema as defined would not be correct use of this specification.¶
OPs can deliver verified_claims in various ways.¶
A verified_claims element can be added to an OpenID Connect UserInfo response or an ID Token.¶
OAuth authorization servers can add verified_claims to access tokens in JWT format or token introspection responses, either in plain JSON or JWT-protected format.¶
Here is an example of the payload of an access token in JWT format including verified claims:¶
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761",
"aud": "https://rs.example.com/",
"exp": 1544645174,
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3_",
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "example"
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Mustermann"
}
}
}
¶
An OP or AS can also include aggregated or distributed verified_claims in the above assertions (see Section 6 for more details).¶
Verified claims can be requested on the level of individual claims about the end-user by utilizing the claims parameter as defined in section 5.5 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].¶
Note: A machine-readable definition of the syntax to be used to request verified_claims is given as JSON schema in [verified_claims_request.json], it can be used to automatically validate claims request parameters. The provided JSON schema files are a non-normative implementation of this specification and any discrepancies that exist are either implementation bugs or interpretations.¶
To request verified claims, the verified_claims element is added to the userinfo or the id_token element of the claims parameter.¶
Since verified_claims contains the effective claims about the end-user in a nested claims element, the syntax is extended to include expressions on nested elements as follows. The verified_claims element includes a claims element, which in turn includes the desired claims as keys. For each claim, the value is either null (default), or an object. The object may contain restrictions using value or values as defined in [OpenID] and/or the essential or purpose keys as described below. An example is shown in the following:¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
Use of the claims parameter allows the RP to request specified claims about the end-user needed for its use case. This allows RPs to fulfill the requirements for data minimization by requesting only claims needed for its use case. Note: it is not possible to request sub-claims (for example the ‘country’ subclaim of the ‘address’ claim) using mechanisms from OpenID Connect Core or this draft.¶
RPs can use the essential field as defined in section 5.5.1 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]. The following example shows this for the family and given names.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null
},
"claims": {
"given_name": {
"essential": true
},
"family_name": {
"essential": true
},
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
RPs request verification data in the same way they request claims about the end-user. When the claims request parameter is being used, the syntax is based on the rules given in Section 5.3 and extends them for navigation into the structure of the verification element.¶
Elements within verification are requested by adding the respective element as shown in the following example:¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null,
"time": null
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
It requests the trust framework the OP complies with and the date of the verification of the end-user claims.¶
The RP shall explicitly request any data it wants the OP to add to the verification element.¶
Therefore, the RP shall set fields one step deeper into the structure if it wants to obtain evidence. One or more entries in the evidence array are used as filter criteria and templates for all entries in the result array. The following example shows a request asking for evidence of type document only.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null,
"time": null,
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
},
"method": null,
"document_details": {
"type": null
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The example also requests the OP to add the respective method and the document elements (including data about the document type), for every evidence array member, to the resulting verified_claims claim.¶
A single entry in the evidence array represents a filter over elements of a certain evidence type. The RP therefore shall specify this type by including the type field including a suitable value sub-element value. The values sub-element shall not be used for the evidence/type field.¶
If multiple entries are present in evidence, these filters are linked by a logical OR.¶
check_details is an array of the processes that have been applied to the evidence. An RP can filter check_details by requesting a particular value for one or more of its sub-elements. If multiple entries for the same sub-element are present this acts as a logical OR between them.¶
assurance_details is an array representing how the evidence and check_details meets the requirements of the trust_framework. RP should only request this where they need to know this information. Where assurance_details have been requested by an RP the OP shall return the assurance_details element along with all sub-elements that it has. If an RP wants to filter what types of evidence and check_methods they shall use those methods to do so, e.g. requesting an assurance_type should have no filtering effect.¶
The RP can also request certain data within the document element to be present. This again follows the syntax rules used above:¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null,
"time": null,
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
},
"method": null,
"document_details": {
"type": null,
"issuer": {
"country": null,
"name": null
},
"document_number": null,
"date_of_issuance": null
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The RP can limit the possible values of the elements trust_framework, evidence/method, evidence/check_details, and evidence/document/type by utilizing the value or values fields and the element evidence/type by utilizing the value field.¶
Note: Examples on the usage of a restriction on evidence/type were given in the previous section.¶
The following example shows how an RP requests claims either complying with trust framework gold or silver.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"values": [
"gold",
"silver"
]
}
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The following example shows that the RP wants to obtain an attestation based on the German anti-money laundering law (trust framework de_aml) and limited to end-users who were identified in a bank branch in person (physical in person proofing - method pipp) using either an idcard or a passport.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "de_aml"
},
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
},
"method": {
"value": "pipp"
},
"document": {
"type": {
"values": [
"idcard",
"passport"
]
}
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The OP shall not ignore some or all of the query restrictions on possible values and shall not deliver available verified/verification data that does not match these constraints.¶
The RP can also express a requirement regarding the age of certain data, like the time elapsed since the issuance/expiry of certain evidence types or since the verification process asserted in the verification element took place. section 5.5.1 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID] defines a query syntax that allows for new special query members to be defined. This specification introduces a new such member max_age, which is applicable to the possible values of any elements containing dates or timestamps (e.g., time, date_of_issuance and date_of_expiry elements of evidence of type document).¶
max_age: Optional. JSON number value only applicable to claims that contain dates or timestamps. It defines the maximum time (in seconds) to be allowed to elapse since the value of the date/timestamp up to the point in time of the request. The OP should make the calculation of elapsed time starting from the last valid second of the date value.¶
The following is an example of a request for claims where the verification process of the data is not allowed to be older than 63113852 seconds:¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "jp_aml"
},
"time": {
"max_age": 63113852
}
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The OP should try to fulfill this requirement. If the verification data of the end-user is older than the requested max_age, the OP can attempt to refresh the end-user’s verification by sending them through an online identity verification process, e.g., by utilizing an electronic ID card or a video identification approach.¶
It is also possible to request different trust frameworks, assurance levels, and methods for different claim sets. This requires the RP to send an array of verified_claims objects instead of passing a single object.¶
The following example illustrates this functionality.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": [
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "eidas"
},
"assurance_level": {
"value": "high"
}
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null
}
},
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "eidas"
},
"assurance_level":{
"values":[
"high",
"substantial"
]
}
},
"claims": {
"birthdate": null
}
}
]
}
}
¶
When the RP requests multiple verifications as described above, the OP will process each element in the array independently. The OP will provide verified_claims response elements for every verified_claims request element whose requirements it is able to fulfill. This also means if multiple verified_claims elements contain the same end-user claim(s), the OP delivers the claim in as many verified claims response objects it can fulfil. For example, if the trust framework the OP uses is compatible with multiple of the requested trust frameworks, it provides a verified_claims element for each of them.¶
The RP can combine multiple verified_claims claims in the request with multiple trust_framework and/or assurance_level values using the values element. In that case, the rules given above for processing values are applied for the particular verified_claims request object.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": [
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "gold"
},
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null
}
},
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"values": [
"silver",
"bronze"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "electronic_record"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null
}
}
]
}
}
¶
In the above example, the RP asks for family and given name either under trust framework gold with an evidence of type document or under trust framework silver or bronze but with an evidence electronic_record.¶
As stated in section 3.3.6 of [OpenID], "the OP may choose to return fewer claims about the end-user from the authorization endpoint". This document makes no change to that provision. The OP may also choose to return a subset of the verification element of any verified_claims providing it remains compliant with the verified_claims JSON schema defined in [OpenID4IDAClaims].¶
In some cases, OPs cannot deliver the requested data to an RP, for example, because the data is not available or does not match the RP's requirements. The rules for handling these cases are described in the following.¶
Extensions of this specification can define additional rules or override these rules, for example¶
Important: The behavior described below is independent from the use of essential (as defined in section 5.5 of [OpenID]).¶
When relying on end-user consent to determine the specific data to be shared the end-user may make a choice to release only a subset of the data requested. In this case data that has not had end-user consent for sharing shall be omitted from any corresponding id_token or Userinfo response.¶
Alternatively, when relying on end-user consent to determine the specific data to be shared the end-user may choose to release none of the data requested. In this case standard OpenID Connect authentication error response logic applies, as defined in section 3.1.2.6 of [OpenID].¶
When the available data does not fulfill the requirements of the RP expressed through value, values, or max_age, the following logic applies:¶
verified_claims/verification, the whole verified_claims element shall be omitted.¶
In both cases, the OP shall not return an error to the RP.¶
If an element is to be omitted according to the rules above, but is a requirement for a valid response, its parent element shall be omitted as well. This process shall be repeated until the response is valid.¶
If the OP encounters an error, standard OpenID Connect authentication error response logic applies, as defined in section 3.1.2.6 of [OpenID].¶
Verified claims about the end-user can be requested as part of a pre-defined set by utilizing the scope parameter as defined in section 5.4 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].¶
When using this approach the claims associated with a scope are administratively defined at the OP. The OP configuration and RP request parameters will determine whether the claims are returned via the ID Token or UserInfo endpoint as defined in section 5.3.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].¶
When distributed claims are used the URL that is the value of the endpoint element in any distributed _claim_source sub-element shall use the https URI scheme and the JWT returned should not be accessible via any other URI scheme.¶
For aggregated or distributed claims, every assertion provided by the external claims source shall contain:¶
typ header parameter with the value provided-claims+jwt,¶
iss claim identifying the claims source,¶
sub claim identifying the end-user in the context of the claim source, and¶
verified_claims element containing one or more verified_claims objects.¶
To ensure that assertions cannot be confused with OpenID Connect ID Tokens, assertions shall not contain:¶
The verified_claims element in an aggregated or distributed claims object shall have one of the following forms:¶
verified_claims where the name of each object is a name for the respective claim source. Every such named object contains sub-objects called claims and verification expressing data provided by the respective claims source. This allows the RP to look ahead before it actually requests distributed claims in order to prevent extra time, cost, data collisions, etc. caused by these requests.¶
Note: The two later forms extend the syntax as defined in section 5.6.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]) in order to accommodate the specific use cases for verified_claims.¶
The following are examples of assertions including verified claims as aggregated claims¶
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"_claim_names": {
"verified_claims": "src1"
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {
"JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjFlOWdkazciLCJ0eXAiOiJwcm92aWRlZC1jbGFpbXMrand0In0.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.VAtHwi85ihW98uulbNOBCkyCyD4jeDrTeaMNdI3Wllks1z-LT8kyzN5Iz7Nu2HpMmmCKZpgY552O0fm_-Fr3Vls3BvmJsh1A524jh9VlsCL-1WezJ-DShjMUyP76_3Xbdl-iYHdWLjoQ5hFZQg6GLrLxOGlQXX9b-kxtQm3DV9nFJhOqMl_5_U8IU_A1LfypmRvXuD1Frw8ASS7OmyGOCkuFDOaV7Uu0BuZjYWiMC8Eem4M2A9RhuoLKDBYuVlwIFaHx-cuGcRJZWDg9K5DekIuLE73Iz1Cuh49HumkC9qGqkTV6EARSJeqFxPhjnZNkJY1e1P7Q7cgyT2HywjR6Tw"
}
}
}
¶
and distributed claims.¶
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"_claim_names": {
"verified_claims": "src1"
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {
"endpoint": "https://server.yetanotherop.com/claim_source",
"access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
}
}
}
¶
The following example shows an ID Token containing verified_claims from two different external claim sources, one as aggregated and the other as distributed claims.¶
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"_claim_names": {
"verified_claims": [
"src1",
"src2"
]
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {
"JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjFlOWdkazciLCJ0eXAiOiJwcm92aWRlZC1jbGFpbXMrand0In0.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.FPYS2Xjz9y9qEOJhBe5nMfL2mTagLDxwISxjM6gv3zRUvU2YBK-GHI_byvK8h46ly1C90ie-X9gOp-DLvpURvyAlZTsvxNL8s0Hi3-SRZCs5huhiCZr5s4FJBG-l0PNrYOIZAHfeQtobJ7muDld3BytS628140V0CHgh_EM8UUjzQmN8NpDaR9HdH0tIeUFqIZEwBluctgwek9eomg3k10dj6NzBUQSSnpgGf_o6f_sYoIAkBhpgRursD5pHbPSOKTGE9cJ882BbHeido746XLxjEfrU5yQwfA0ggVk5I_e-wv-xVXfVGda4WySZfbkwS5PMCMgMJM9ZT_L1pci0yQ"
},
"src2": {
"endpoint": "https://server.yetanotherop.com/claim_source",
"access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
}
}
}
¶
The next example shows an ID Token containing verified_claims from two different external claim sources along with additional data about the content of the verified claims (look ahead).¶
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"_claim_names": {
"verified_claims": {
"src1": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "trust_framework_example"
}
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null
}
},
"src2": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "grids_kyb"
},
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
},
"registry": {
"country": {
"essential": true,
"value": "ES"
}
},
"document": {
"SKU": {
"value": "REX"
}
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"email": null,
"nationalities": null
}
}
}
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {
"JWT": "eyJraWQiOiJmMDgxZDI5OC1jNTgzLTQ3NDAtYWQ1NC02ZDUzMTljZjhiNWQiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogICAic3ViIjogIjE0ODI4OTc2MiIsDQogICAidmVyaWZpZWRfY2xhaW1zIjogew0KICAgICJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOiB7DQogICAgICAidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjogInRydXN0X2ZyYW1ld29ya19leGFtcGxlIg0KICAgIH0sDQogICAgImNsYWltcyI6IHsNCiAgICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogIk1heCIsDQogICAgICAiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiOiAiTWVpZXIiDQogICAgfQ0KICB9DQp9.jg_qxYfV0M2IU8On1iK9RBY0Cx9u3jRJ0Qzxe19Ol5VLoUTM7Uxbr3E0ZFCASHWpmz9d2g67XKGHQMppnJKX4SnEdphm6MqjnmZ9E0cirALrC016DX5geFy_0QFC8PAnCttcDgyVCyzCcDxUCaHBSRsrDwGjYe5AjgaDL8S-R72lFQHqch6uj9nhiFBtG24_0EsF6msssQ61WyqS6aju0F0PJms8danIfwc5lHyv-zKuDlY-0kw-fVn4274jY-VofElm4mhsrpo-YJhCKlz0O3CV0g9AW_60TQHCmhn6yoosaTbjlQqh5lREpqULz-MQKnD0wRmYLgBZXtzIhxb7ZA"
},
"src2": {
"endpoint": "https://server.yetanotherop.com/claim_source",
"access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
}
}
}
¶
Claim sources should sign the assertions containing verified_claims in order to demonstrate authenticity and provide for non-repudiation.
RP should determine the key material used for validation of the signed assertions is via the claim source's public keys. These keys should be available in the JSON web key set available in the jwks_uri metadata value in the openid-configuration metadata document. This document can be discovered using the iss claim of the particular JWT.¶
The OP can combine aggregated and distributed claims with verified_claims provided by itself (see Appendix C.8).¶
If verified_claims elements are contained in multiple places of a response, e.g., in the ID Token and an embedded aggregated claim, the RP shall preserve the claims source as context of the particular verified_claims element.¶
Note: Any assertion provided by an OP or AS including aggregated or distributed claims can contain multiple instances of the same end-user Claim. It is up to the RP to decide how to process these different instances.¶
Clients shall validate any aggregated and distributed verified_claims they wish to rely on in the following manner:¶
_claim_names and _claim_sources are present in the response¶
verified_claims element present in the _claim_names member of the response¶
verified_claims element contains a value that is one of the following:
a. a string that exists as a key name in the _claim_sources element of the response.
b. a JSON array containing members that all exist as key names in the _claim_sources element of the response.
c. a JSON object containing elements that all exist as key names in the _claim_sources element of the response and each element is formatted with the syntax as defined for requesting verified_claims.¶
_claim_sources element is a JSON structured object that has one or more sub-elements¶
_claim_sources element have matching values in the _claim_names element of the response¶
When verified_claims are delivered as distributed claims, i.e., when a sub-element of the _claim_sources contains the endpoint claim, clients shall also:¶
endpoint element defined in any distributed _claim_sources uses the https URI scheme.¶
endpoint element defined in any distributed _claim_sources.¶
endpoint is a JWT as per [RFC7519].¶
When verified_claims are delivered as aggregated claims, i.e., when a sub-element of the _claim_sources contains the JWT claim, clients shall also:¶
Once the JWT has been delivered either via distributed or aggregated mechanism the client shall:¶
typ, iss, sub, and verified_claims elements; and that their values are not null or empty.¶
exp claim or an aud claim.¶
typ header parameter in the JWT is provided-claims+jwt.¶
Making a request for verified claims and related verification data can be explicitly requested on the level of individual data elements by utilizing the claims parameter as defined in section 5.5 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].¶
It is also possible to use the scope parameter to request one or more specific pre-defined claim sets as defined in section 5.4 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].¶
Note: The OP shall not provide the RP with any data it did not request. However, the OP may at its discretion omit claims from the response.¶
The example authorize call in this section will use the following unencoded example claims request parameter:¶
{
"id_token": {
"given_name": null,
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null
},
"claims": {
"family_name": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The following is the non-normative example request that would be sent by the user agent to the authorization server in response to the HTTP 302 redirect from the client initiating the authorization code flow (with line wraps within values for display purposes only):¶
GET /authorize?
response_type=code
&scope=openid%20email
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&claims=%7B%22id_token%22%3A%20%7B%22
given_name%22%3A%20null%2C%22
verified_claims%22%3A%20%7B%22
verification%22%3A%20%7B%22
trust_framework%22%3A%20null%7D%2C%22
claims%22%3A%20%7B%22
family_name%22%3A%20null%7D%7D%7D%7D HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
¶
The OP advertises its capabilities with respect to verified claims in its openid-configuration (see [OpenID-Discovery]) using the following new elements:¶
trust_frameworks_supported: Required. JSON array containing all supported trust frameworks. This array shall have at least one member.¶
claims_in_verified_claims_supported: Required. JSON array containing all claims supported within verified_claims. claims that are not present in this array shall not be returned within the verified_claims object. This array shall have at least one member.¶
evidence_supported: Required when one or more type of evidence is supported. JSON array containing all types of identity evidence the OP uses. This array shall have at least one member. Members of this array should only be the types of evidence supported by the OP in the evidence element (see section 4.2.2 of [IDA-verified-claims]).¶
documents_supported: Required when evidence_supported contains "document". JSON array containing all identity document types utilized by the OP for identity verification. This array shall have at least one member.¶
documents_methods_supported: Optional. JSON array containing the verification methods the OP supports for evidences of type "document" (see @!predefined_values). When present this array shall have at least one member.¶
documents_check_methods_supported: Optional. JSON array containing the check methods the OP supports for evidences of type "document" (see Section 12). When present this array shall have at least one member.¶
electronic_records_supported: Required when evidence_supported contains "electronic_record". JSON array containing all electronic record types the OP supports (see Section 12). When present this array shall have at least one member.¶
This is an example openid-configuration snippet:¶
{
...
"trust_frameworks_supported":[
"nist_800_63A"
],
"evidence_supported": [
"document",
"electronic_record",
"vouch",
"electronic_signature"
],
"documents_supported": [
"idcard",
"passport",
"driving_permit"
],
"documents_methods_supported": [
"pipp",
"sripp",
"eid"
],
"electronic_records_supported": [
"secure_mail"
],
"claims_in_verified_claims_supported": [
"given_name",
"family_name",
"birthdate",
"place_of_birth",
"nationalities",
"address"
],
...
}
¶
If the OP supports the claims parameter as defined in section 5.5 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID], the OP shall advertise this in its OP metadata using the claims_parameter_supported element.¶
If the OP supports distributed and/or aggregated claim types, as defined in section 5.6.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID], in verified_claims, the OP shall advertise this in its metadata using the claim_types_supported element.¶
The use of scopes is a potential shortcut to request a pre-defined set of claims, however, the use of scopes might result in more data being returned to the RP than is strictly necessary and not achieving the goal of data minimization. The RP should only request end-user claims and metadata it requires.¶
Timestamps with a time zone component can potentially reveal the person’s location. To preserve the person’s privacy, timestamps within the verification element and verified claims that represent times should be represented in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), unless there is a specific reason to include the time zone, such as the time zone being an essential part of a consented time related claim in verified data.¶
This specification focuses on mechanisms to carry end-user claims and accompanying metadata in JSON objects and JSON web tokens, typically as part of an OpenID Connect protocol exchange. Since such an exchange is supposed to take place in security sensitive use cases, implementers shall:¶
Secure identification of end-users not only depends on the identity verification at the OP but also on the strength of the user authentication at the OP. Combining a strong identification with weak authentication creates a false impression of security while being open to attacks. For example if an OP uses a simple PIN login, an attacker could guess the PIN of another user and identify himself as the other user at an RP with a high identity assurance level. To prevent this kind of attack, RPs should request the OP to authenticate the user at a reasonable level, typically using multi-factor authentication, when requesting verified end-user claims. OpenID Connect supports this by way of the acr_values request parameter.¶
This specification does not define or require a particular security profile since there are several security profiles and new security profiles under development. Implementers have the flexibility to select the security profile that best suits their needs. Implementers might consider [FAPI-1-RW] or [FAPI-2-BL].¶
Implementers should select a security profile that has a certification program or other resources that allow both OpenID providers and relying parties to ensure they have complied with the profile’s security and interoperability requirements, such as the OpenID Foundation Certification Program, https://openid.net/certification/.¶
The integrity and authenticity of the issued assertions shall be ensured in order to prevent identity spoofing.¶
The confidentiality of all end-user data exchanged between the protocol parties shall be ensured using suitable methods at transport or application layer.¶
To achieve the full security and interoperability benefits, it is important the implementation of this specification, and the underlying OpenID Connect and OAuth specifications, and selected security profile, are complete and correct. The OpenID Foundation provides tools that should be used to confirm that deployments behave as described in the specifications, with information available at: https://openid.net/certification/.¶
This specification focuses on the technical mechanisms to convey verified claims and thus does not define any identifiers for trust frameworks, documents, methods, check methods. This is left to adopters of the technical specification, e.g., implementers, identity schemes, or jurisdictions.¶
Each party defining such identifiers shall ensure the collision resistance of these identifiers. This is achieved by including a domain name under the control of this party into the identifier name, e.g., https://mycompany.com/identifiers/cool_check_method.¶
The eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group maintains a wiki page [predefined_values_page] that can be utilized to share predefined values with other parties.¶
This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims Registry" established by [RFC7519].¶
verified_claims¶
This section registers the application/provided-claims+jwt media type [RFC2046]
in the IANA "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described in [RFC6838],
which is used to indicate that the content is a JWT describing aggregated claims.¶
typ header of assertions provided as aggregated or distributed claims (see section 5.6.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]).¶
Additional information:¶
This section shows examples of requests for verified_claims.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null,
"time": null,
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
},
"method": null,
"document_details": {
"type": null
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
Note that, as shown in the above example, this specification requires that implementations receiving requests are able to distinguish between JSON objects where a key is not present versus where a key is present with a null value.¶
Support for these null value requests is mandatory for identity providers, so implementors are encouraged to test this behaviour early in their development process. In some programming languages many JSON libraries or HTTP frameworks will, at least by default, ignore null values and omit the relevant key when parsing the JSON.¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": [
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "gold"
},
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null
}
},
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"values": [
"silver",
"bronze"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "vouch"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null
}
}
]
}
}
¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": {
"value": "it_spid"
},
"time": null,
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
},
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": {
"value": "bvr"
}
}
],
"document_details": {
"type": null,
"issuer": {
"country": null,
"name": null
},
"document_number": null,
"date_of_issuance": null
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null,
"time": null,
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "electronic_signature"
},
"issuer": null,
"serial_number": null,
"created_at": null
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
This section shows examples of responses containing verified_claims.¶
The first and second subsections show JSON snippets of the general identity assurance case, where the RP is provided with verification evidence for different methods along with the actual claims about the end-user.¶
The third subsection illustrates the possible contents of this object in case of a notified eID system under eIDAS, where the OP does not need to provide evidence of the identity verification process to the RP.¶
Subsequent subsections contain examples for using the verified_claims claim on different channels and in combination with other (unverified) claims.¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "nist_800_63A",
"assurance_level": "ial2",
"assurance_process": {
"assurance_details": [
{
"assurance_type": "evidence_validation",
"assurance_classification": "strong",
"evidence_ref": [
{
"check_id": "DL1-93h506th2f45hf"
}
]
},
{
"assurance_type": "verification",
"assurance_classification": "strong",
"evidence_ref": [
{
"check_id": "v-93jfk284ugjfj2093"
}
]
}
]
},
"time": "2021-06-06T05:32Z",
"verification_process": "7675D80F-57E0-AB14-9543-26B41FC22",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "document",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "vpiruv",
"organization": "doc_checker",
"check_id": "DL1-93h506th2f45hf"
},
{
"check_method": "pvp",
"organization": "face_checker",
"check_id": "v-93jfk284ugjfj2093"
}
],
"time": "2021-06-06T05:33Z",
"document_details": {
"type": "driving_permit",
"document_number": "I1234568",
"date_of_issuance": "2019-09-05",
"date_of_expiry": "2024-08-01",
"issuer": {
"name": "CA DMV",
"country": "US",
"country_code": "USA",
"jurisdiction": "CA"
}
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Inga",
"family_name": "Silverstone",
"birthdate": "1991-11-06",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "USA"
},
"address": {
"locality": "Shoshone",
"postal_code": "CA 92384",
"country": "USA",
"street_address": "114 Old State Hwy 127"
}
}
}
}
¶
Same document under a different trust_framework¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "uk_diatf",
"assurance_level": "medium",
"assurance_process": {
"policy": "gpg45",
"procedure": "m1c",
"assurance_details": [
{
"assurance_type": "evidence_validation",
"assurance_classification": "score_3",
"evidence_ref": [
{
"check_id": "DL1-93h506th2f45hf",
"evidence_metadata": {
"evidence_classification": "score_3_strength"
}
}
]
},
{
"assurance_type": "verification",
"assurance_classification": "score_3",
"evidence_ref": [
{
"check_id": "v-93jfk284ugjfj2093"
}
]
}
]
},
"time": "2021-06-06T05:32Z",
"verification_process": "7675D80F-57E0-AB14-9543-26B41FC22",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "document",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "vpiruv",
"organization": "doc_checker",
"check_id": "DL1-93h506th2f45hf",
"time": "2021-06-08T11:41Z"
},
{
"check_method": "pvp",
"organization": "face_checker",
"check_id": "v-93jfk284ugjfj2093",
"time": "2021-06-08T11:42Z"
}
],
"time": "2021-06-06T05:33Z",
"document_details": {
"type": "driving_permit",
"document_number": "I1234568",
"date_of_issuance": "2019-09-05",
"date_of_expiry": "2024-08-01",
"issuer": {
"name": "CA DMV",
"country": "US",
"country_code": "USA",
"jurisdiction": "CA"
}
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Inga",
"family_name": "Silverstone",
"birthdate": "1991-11-06",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "USA"
},
"address": {
"locality": "Shoshone",
"postal_code": "CA 92384",
"country": "USA",
"street_address": "114 Old State Hwy 127"
}
}
}
}
¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "de_aml",
"time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
"verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "document",
"method": "pipp",
"organization": "Deutsche Post",
"check_id": "1aa05779-0775-470f-a5c4-9f1f5e56cf06",
"time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
"document_details": {
"type": "idcard",
"issuer": {
"name": "Stadt Augsburg",
"country": "DE"
},
"document_number": "53554554",
"date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
"date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Meier",
"birthdate": "1956-01-28",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "DE",
"locality": "Musterstadt"
},
"nationalities": [
"DE"
],
"address": {
"locality": "Maxstadt",
"postal_code": "12344",
"country": "DE",
"street_address": "An der Weide 22"
}
}
}
}
¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "uk_diatf",
"assurance_level": "medium",
"assurance_process": {
"policy": "gpg45",
"procedure": "m1b",
"assurance_details": [
{
"assurance_type": "evidence_validation",
"assurance_classification": "score_2",
"evidence_ref": [
{
"check_id": "DL1-85762937582385820",
"evidence_metadata": {
"evidence_classification": "score_3_strength"
}
}
]
},
{
"assurance_type": "verification",
"assurance_classification": "score_2",
"evidence_ref": [
{
"check_id": "kbv1-hf934hn09234ng03jj3",
"evidence_metadata": {
"evidence_classification": "high_kbv"
}
},
{
"check_id": "kbv2-nm0f23u9459fj38u5j6",
"evidence_metadata": {
"evidence_classification": "medium_kbv"
}
},
{
"check_id": "kbv3-jf9028h023hj0f9jh23",
"evidence_metadata": {
"evidence_classification": "medium_kbv"
}
}
]
},
{
"assurance_type": "counter_fraud",
"assurance_classification": "score_2",
"evidence_ref": [
{
"check_id": "GRO-9824hngvp9278hf5tmp924y5h",
"evidence_metadata": {
"evidence_classification": "mortality_check"
}
},
{
"check_id": "fi-2nbf02hfn384ufn",
"evidence_metadata": {
"evidence_classification": "id_fraud"
}
}
]
}
]
},
"time": "2021-05-11T14:29Z",
"verification_process": "7675D80F-57E0-AB14-9543-26B41FC22",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "document",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "data",
"organization": "DVLA",
"time": "2021-04-09T14:15Z",
"check_id": "DL1-85762937582385820"
}
],
"time": "2021-04-09T14:12Z",
"document_details": {
"type": "driving_permit",
"personal_number": "MORGA753116SM9IJ",
"document_number": "MORGA753116SM9IJ35",
"serial_number": "ZG21000001",
"date_of_issuance": "2021-01-01",
"date_of_expiry": "2030-12-31",
"issuer": {
"name": "DVLA",
"country": "UK",
"country_code": "GBR",
"jurisdiction": "GB-GBN"
}
}
},
{
"type": "electronic_record",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "kbv",
"organization": "TheCreditBureau",
"check_id": "kbv1-hf934hn09234ng03jj3"
}
],
"time": "2021-04-09T14:12Z",
"record": {
"type": "mortgage_account",
"source": {
"name": "TheCreditBureau"
}
}
},
{
"type": "electronic_record",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "kbv",
"organization": "OpenBankingTPP",
"check_id": "kbv2-nm0f23u9459fj38u5j6"
}
],
"time": "2021-04-09T14:12Z",
"record": {
"type": "bank_account",
"source": {
"name": "TheBank"
}
}
},
{
"type": "electronic_record",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "kbv",
"organization": "GSMA",
"check_id": "kbv3-jf9028h023hj0f9jh23"
}
],
"time": "2021-04-09T15:42Z",
"record": {
"type": "mno",
"source": {
"name": "Vodafone"
}
}
},
{
"type": "electronic_record",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "data",
"organization": "GRO",
"check_id": "GRO-9824hngvp9278hf5tmp924y5h"
}
],
"time": "2021-04-09T16:12Z",
"record": {
"type": "death_register",
"source": {
"name": "General Register Office",
"street_address": "PO BOX 2",
"locality": "Southport",
"postal_code": "PR8 2JD",
"country": "UK",
"country_code": "GBR",
"jurisdiction": "GB-EAW"
}
}
},
{
"type": "electronic_record",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "data",
"organization": "NextLex",
"check_id": "fi-2nbf02hfn384ufn"
}
],
"time": "2021-04-09T16:51Z",
"record": {
"type": "fraud_register",
"source": {
"name": "National Fraud Database",
"jurisdiction": "UK"
}
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Sarah",
"family_name": "Meredyth",
"birthdate": "1976-03-11",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "UK"
},
"address": {
"locality": "Edinburgh",
"postal_code": "EH1 9GP",
"country": "UK",
"street_address": "122 Burns Crescent"
}
}
}
}
¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "eidas",
"assurance_level": "substantial"
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Meier",
"birthdate": "1956-01-28",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "DE",
"locality": "Musterstadt"
},
"nationalities": [
"DE"
]
}
}
}
¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "se_bankid",
"assurance_level": "al_2",
"time": "2021-03-03T09:42Z",
"verification_process": "4346D80F-57E0-4E26-9543-26B41FC22",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "electronic_record",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "data"
},
{
"check_method": "token"
}
],
"time": "2021-02-15T16:51Z",
"record": {
"type": "population_register",
"source": {
"name": "Skatteverket",
"country": "Sverige",
"country_code": "SWE"
},
"personal_number": "4901224131",
"created_at": "1979-01-22"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Fredrik",
"family_name": "Strömberg",
"birthdate": "1979-01-22",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "SWE",
"locality": "Örnsköldsvik"
},
"nationalities": [
"SE"
],
"address": {
"locality": "Karlstad",
"postal_code": "65344",
"country": "SWE",
"street_address": "Gatunamn 221b"
}
}
}
}
¶
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "uk_diatf",
"assurance_level": "very_high",
"time": "2020-03-19T13:05Z",
"verification_process": "76755DA2-81E1-5N14-9543-26B415B77",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "vouch",
"check_details": [
{
"check_method": "vcrypt"
},
{
"check_method": "bvr"
}
],
"time": "2020-03-19T12:42Z",
"attestation": {
"type": "digital_attestation",
"reference_number": "6485-1619-3976-6671",
"date_of_issuance": "2021-06-04",
"voucher": {
"organization": "HMP Dartmoor"
}
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Sam",
"family_name": "Lawler",
"birthdate": "1981-04-13",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "GBR"
},
"address": {
"postal_code": "98015",
"country": "Monaco"
}
}
}
}
¶
{
"verified_claims": [
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "eidas",
"assurance_level": "substantial"
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Meier",
"birthdate": "1956-01-28",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "DE",
"locality": "Musterstadt"
},
"nationalities": [
"DE"
]
}
},
{
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "de_aml",
"time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
"verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "document",
"method": "pipp",
"time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
"document": {
"type": "idcard"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"address": {
"locality": "Maxstadt",
"postal_code": "12344",
"country": "DE",
"street_address": "An der Weide 22"
}
}
}
]
}
¶
This example shows how an OP can mix own claims and claims provided by external sources in a single ID Token.¶
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "trust_framework_example"
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Meier"
}
},
"_claim_names": {
"verified_claims": [
"src1",
"src2"
]
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {
"JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.FArlPUtUVn95HCExePlWJQ6ctVfVpQyeSbe3xkH9MH1QJjnk5GVbBW0qe1b7R3lE-8iVv__0mhRTUI5lcFhLjoGjDS8zgWSarVsEEjwBK7WD3r9cEw6ZAhfEkhHL9eqAaED2rhhDbHD5dZWXkJCuXIcn65g6rryiBanxlXK0ZmcK4fD9HV9MFduk0LRG_p4yocMaFvVkqawat5NV9QQ3ij7UBr3G7A4FojcKEkoJKScdGoozir8m5XD83Sn45_79nCcgWSnCX2QTukL8NywIItu_K48cjHiAGXXSzydDm_ccGCe0sY-Ai2-iFFuQo2PtfuK2SqPPmAZJxEFrFoLY4g"
},
"src2": {
"endpoint": "https://server.yetanotherop.com/claim_source",
"access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
}
}
}
¶
This example shows how a Self-Issued OpenID Connect provider (SIOP) may include verified claims obtained from different external claim sources into a ID Token.¶
{
"iss": "https://self-issued.me",
"sub": "248289761001",
"preferred_username": "superman445",
"_claim_names": {
"verified_claims": [
"src1",
"src2"
]
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {
"JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.FArlPUtUVn95HCExePlWJQ6ctVfVpQyeSbe3xkH9MH1QJjnk5GVbBW0qe1b7R3lE-8iVv__0mhRTUI5lcFhLjoGjDS8zgWSarVsEEjwBK7WD3r9cEw6ZAhfEkhHL9eqAaED2rhhDbHD5dZWXkJCuXIcn65g6rryiBanxlXK0ZmcK4fD9HV9MFduk0LRG_p4yocMaFvVkqawat5NV9QQ3ij7UBr3G7A4FojcKEkoJKScdGoozir8m5XD83Sn45_79nCcgWSnCX2QTukL8NywIItu_K48cjHiAGXXSzydDm_ccGCe0sY-Ai2-iFFuQo2PtfuK2SqPPmAZJxEFrFoLY4g"
},
"src2": {
"endpoint": "https://op.mymno.com/claim_source",
"access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
}
}
}
¶
This section shows examples of pairs of requests and responses containing verified_claims.¶
In this example we assume the RP uses the scope parameter to request the email address and, additionally, the claims parameter, to request verified claims.¶
The scope value is: scope=openid email¶
The value of the claims parameter is:¶
{
"userinfo": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The respective UserInfo response would be¶
{
"sub": "248289761001",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "de_aml"
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Meier",
"birthdate": "1956-01-28"
}
}
}
¶
In this case, the RP requests verified claims along with other claims about the end-user in the claims parameter and allocates the response to the ID Token (delivered from the token endpoint in case of grant type authorization_code).¶
The claims parameter value is¶
{
"id_token": {
"email": null,
"preferred_username": null,
"picture": null,
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": null,
"time": null,
"verification_process": null,
"evidence": [
{
"type": {
"value": "document"
},
"method": null,
"time": null,
"document_details": {
"type": null,
"issuer": {
"name": null,
"country": null
},
"document_number": null,
"date_of_issuance": null,
"date_of_expiry": null
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": null,
"family_name": null,
"birthdate": null
}
}
}
}
¶
The decoded body of the respective ID Token could be¶
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"auth_time": 1311280969,
"acr": "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"preferred_username": "j.doe",
"picture": "http://example.com/janedoe/me.jpg",
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "de_aml",
"time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
"verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "document",
"method": "pipp",
"time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
"document_details": {
"type": "idcard",
"issuer": {
"name": "Stadt Augsburg",
"country": "DE"
},
"document_number": "53554554",
"date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
"date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"birthdate": "1956-01-28"
}
}
}
¶
The following people at yes.com and partner companies contributed to the concept described in the initial contribution to this specification: Karsten Buch, Lukas Stiebig, Sven Manz, Waldemar Zimpfer, Willi Wiedergold, Fabian Hoffmann, Daniel Keijsers, Ralf Wagner, Sebastian Ebling, Peter Eisenhofer.¶
We would like to thank Julian White, Bjorn Hjelm, Stephane Mouy, Alberto Pulido, Joseph Heenan, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Azusa Kikuchi, Naohiro Fujie, Takahiko Kawasaki, Sebastian Ebling, Marcos Sanz, Tom Jones, Mike Pegman, Michael B. Jones, Jeff Lombardo, Taylor Ongaro, Peter Bainbridge-Clayton, Adrian Field, George Fletcher, Tim Cappalli, Michael Palage, Sascha Preibisch, Giuseppe De Marco, Nick Mothershaw, Dima Postnikov and Nat Sakimura for their valuable feedback and contributions that helped to evolve this specification.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 The OpenID Foundation.¶
The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.¶
The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
-15 * Reformatted to meet ISO Directive part 2 * Fixed typos¶
-14¶
utility_bill and document¶
verified_claims into separate document¶
txn element to check_id¶
-13¶
-12¶
document evidence type, which is more universal than id_document¶
id_document¶
electronic_record and vouch evidence types¶
check_details & assurance_details to provide more detail than method¶
qes to electronic_signature¶
also_known_as¶
assurance_level field¶
assurance_process type¶
country_code to address claim¶
-11¶
msisdn claim¶
-10¶
-09¶
verified_claims element may contain one or more verified claims objects¶
verified_claims elements in the assertion itself and any aggregated or distributed claims sets it includes or refers to, respectively¶
verified_claims to bare minimum¶
-08¶
-07¶
nationality String claim to nationalities String array claim¶
agent in id_document verifier element by txn element¶
issuer¶
issued_at to created_at since this field applies to the signature (that is created and not issued)¶
nationalities and issuing country to ICAO codes¶
date in verification element to time¶
-06¶
purpose field to claims parameter¶
verification data¶
-05¶
birth_name with birth_family_name, birth_given_name, and birth_middle_name¶
transaction_id with txn from RFC 8417¶
purpose and locales¶
id to verification_process¶
verified_person_data to verified_claims¶
-04¶
-03¶
verified_person_data claim¶
region field to place_of_birth claim¶
eidas_loa_substantial/high to eidas_ial_substantial/high¶
claims to align with OpenID Connect Core¶
-02¶
purpose¶
identity_documents_supported to metadata section¶
-01¶
claims sub element (issue 1079)¶
legal_context to trust_framework¶
trust_framework, identity_document and (verification) method¶
max_age member to alig with OpenID Core¶
-00 (WG document)¶
unable_to_meet_requirement¶