openid-connect-4-identity-assurance-1_0 March 2021
Lodderstedt, et al. Standards Track [Page]
Workgroup:
eKYC-IDA
Internet-Draft:
openid-connect-4-identity-assurance-1_0-12
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Authors:
T. Lodderstedt
yes.com
D. Fett
yes.com
M. Haine
Considrd.Consulting Ltd
A. Pulido
Santander
K. Lehmann
1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH
K. Koiwai
KDDI Corporation

OpenID Connect for Identity Assurance 1.0

Abstract

This specification defines an extension of OpenID Connect for providing Relying Parties with verified Claims about End-Users. This extension is intended to be used to verify the identity of a natural person.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This specification defines an extension to OpenID Connect [OpenID] for providing Relying Parties with identity information, i.e. verified Claims, along with an explicit statememt about the verification status of those Claims (what, how, when, according to what rules, using what evidence). This specification is aimed at enabling use cases requiring strong identity assurance, for example, to comply with potential regulatory requirements such as Anti-Money Laundering laws or access to health data, risk mitigation, or fraud prevention.

In such use cases, the Relying Party (RP) needs to understand the trustworhthiness or assurance level of the Claim about the End-User that the OpenID Connect Provider (OP) is willing to communicate, along with process-related information and evidence used to verify the user Claims.

The acr Claim, as defined in Section 2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID], is suited to assure information about the authentication performed in an OpenID Connect transaction. But identity assurance requires a different representation for the following reason: authentication is an aspect of an OpenID Connect transaction while identity assurance is a property of a certain Claim or a group of Claims and several of them will typically be conveyed to the RP as the result of an OpenID Connect transaction.

For example, the assurance an OP typically will be able to give for an e-mail address will be "self-asserted" or "verified by opt-in or similar mechanism". The family name of a user, in contrast, might have been verified in accordance with the respective Anti Money Laundering Law by showing an ID Card to a trained employee of the OP operator.

Identity assurance therefore requires a way to convey assurance data along with and coupled to the respective Claims about the End-User. This specification defines a suitable representation and mechanisms the RP will utilize to request verified claims about an End-User along with identity assurance data and for the OP to represent these verified Claims and accompanying identity assurance data.

Note: this specifications fulfills the criteria for portability and interoperability mechanisms of Digital ID systems as defined in [FATF-Digital-Identity] .

1.1. Terminology

This section defines some terms relevant to the topic covered in this document, inspired by NIST SP 800-63A [NIST-SP-800-63a].

  • Identity Proofing - process in which a user provides evidence to an OP or claim provider reliably identifying themselves, thereby allowing the OP or claim provider to assert that identification at a useful identity assurance level.

  • Identity Verification - process conducted by the OP or a claim provider to verify the user's identity.

  • Identity Assurance - process in which the OP or a claim provider asserts identity data of a certain user with a certain assurance towards an RP, typically expressed by way of an assurance level. Depending on legal requirements, the OP may also be required to provide evidence of the identity verification process to the RP.

  • Verified Claims - Claims about an End-User, typically a natural person, whose binding to a particular user account was verified in the course of an identity verification process.

2. Scope

This specification defines the technical mechanisms to allow Relying Parties to request verified Claims and to enable OpenID Providers to provide Relying Parties with verified Claims ("the tools").

Additional facets needed to deploy a complete solution for identity assurance, such as legal aspects (including liability), concrete trust frameworks, or commercial agreements are out of scope. It is up to the particular deployment to complement the technical solution based on this specification with the respective definitions ("the rules").

Note: although such aspects are out of scope, the aim of the specification is to enable implementations of the technical mechanism to be flexible enough to fulfill different legal and commercial requirements in jurisdictions around the world. Consequently, such requirements will be discussed in this specification as examples.

3. Requirements

The RP will be able to request the minimal data set it needs (data minimization) and to express requirements regarding this data, the evidence and the identity verification processes employed by the OP.

This extension will be usable by OPs operating under a certain regulation related to identity assurance, such as eIDAS, as well as other OPs operating without such a regulation.

It is assumed that OPs operating under a suitable regulation can assure identity data without the need to provide further evidence since they are approved to operate according to well-defined rules with clearly defined liability. For example in the case of eIDAS, the peer review ensures eIDAS compliance and the respective member state assumes the liability for the identities asserted by its notified eID systems.

Every other OP not operating under such well-defined conditions may be required to provide the RP data about the identity verification process along with identity evidence to allow the RP to conduct their own risk assessment and to map the data obtained from the OP to other laws. For example, if an OP verifies and maintains identity data in accordance with an Anti Money Laundering Law, it shall be possible for an RP to use the respective identity in a different regulatory context, such as eHealth or the beforementioned eIDAS.

The basic idea of this specification is that the OP provides all identity data along with metadata about the identity verification process at the OP. It is the responsibility of the RP to assess this data and map it into its own legal context.

From a technical perspective, this means this specification allows the OP to provide verified Claims along with information about the respective trust framework, but also supports the externalization of information about the identity verification process.

The representation defined in this specification can be used to provide RPs with verified Claims about the End-User via any appropriate channel. In the context of OpenID Connnect, verified Claims can be provided in ID Tokens or as part of the UserInfo response. It is also possible to utilize the format described here in OAuth Access Tokens or Token Introspection responses (see [RFC7662] and [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response]) to provide resource servers with verified Claims.

This extension is intended to be truly international and support identity assurance across different jurisdictions and across jurisdictions. The extension is therefore extensible to support various trust frameworks, verification methods, and identity evidence.

In order to give implementors as much flexibility as possible, this extension can be used in conjunction with existing OpenID Connect Claims and other extensions within the same OpenID Connect assertion (e.g., ID Token or UserInfo response) utilized to convey Claims about End-Users.

For example, OpenID Connect [OpenID] defines Claims for representing family name and given name of a user without a verification status. Those Claims can be used in the same OpenID Connect assertion beside verified Claims represented according to this extension.

In the same way, existing Claims to inform the RP of the verification status of the phone_number and email Claims can be used together with this extension.

Even for representing verified Claims, this extension utilizes existing OpenID Connect Claims if possible and reasonable. The extension will, however, ensure RPs cannot (accidentally) interpret unverified Claims as verified Claims.

4. Claims

4.1. Additional Claims about End-Users

In order to fulfill the requirements of some jurisdictions on identity assurance, this specification defines the following Claims for conveying user data in addition to the Claims defined in the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]:

Table 1
Claim Type Description
place_of_birth JSON object End-User's place of birth. The value of this member is a JSON structure containing some or all of the following members:
country: String representing country in [ISO3166-1] Alpha-2 (e.g., DE) or [ISO3166-3] syntax.
region: String representing state, province, prefecture, or region component. This field might be required in some jurisdictions.
locality: String representing city or locality component.
nationalities array End-User's nationalities in ICAO 2-letter codes [ICAO-Doc9303], e.g. "US" or "DE". 3-letter codes MAY be used when there is no corresponding ISO 2-letter code, such as "EUE".
birth_family_name string End-User's family name(s) when they were born, or at least from the time they were a child. This term can be used by a person who changes the family name later in life for any reason. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple family names or no family name; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.
birth_given_name string End-User's given name(s) when they were born, or at least from the time they were a child. This term can be used by a person who changes the given name later in life for any reason. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple given names; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.
birth_middle_name string End-User's middle name(s) when they were born, or at least from the time they were a child. This term can be used by a person who changes the middle name later in life for any reason. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple middle names; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters. Also note that in some cultures, middle names are not used.
salutation string End-User's salutation, e.g. "Mr."
title string End-User's title, e.g. "Dr."
msisdn string End-User's mobile phone number formatted according to ITU-T recommendation [E.164], e.g. "+1999550123"
also_known_as string Stage name, religious name or any other type of alias/pseudonym with which a person is known in a specific context besides its legal name. This must be part of the applicable legislation and thus the trust framework (e.g., be an attribute on the identity card).

4.2. txn Claim

Strong identity verification typically requires the participants to keep an audit trail of the whole process.

The txn Claim as defined in [RFC8417] is used in the context of this extension to build audit trails across the parties involved in an OpenID Connect transaction.

If the OP issues a txn, it MUST maintain a corresponding audit trail, which at least consists of the following details:

  • the transaction ID,

  • the authentication method employed, and

  • the transaction type (e.g. the set of claims returned).

This transaction data MUST be stored as long as it is required to store transaction data for auditing purposes by the respective regulation.

The RP requests this Claim like any other Claim via the claims parameter or as part of a default Claim set identified by a scope value.

The txn value MUST allow an RP to obtain these transaction details if needed.

Note: The mechanism to obtain the transaction details from the OP and their format is out of scope of this specification.

5. verified_claims Element

This specification defines a generic mechanism to add verified claims to JSON-based assertions. The basic idea is to use a container element, called verified_claims to provide the RP with a set of Claims along with the respective metadata and verification evidence related to the verification of these claims. This way RPs cannot mix up verified and unverified Claims and accidentally process unverified Claims as verified Claims.

The following example

{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "ial_example_gold"
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier"
    }
  }
}

would assert to the RP that the OP has verified the claims provided (given_name and family_name) according to an example trust framework ial_example_gold.

The normative definition is given in the following.

verified_claims: Object or array containing one or more verified claims objects.

A single verified_claims object consists of the following sub-elements:

Note: Implementations MUST ignore any sub-element not defined in this specification or extensions of this specification.

Note: If not stated otherwise, every sub-element in verified_claims is defined as optional. Extensions of this specification, including trust framework definitions, can define further constraints on the data structure.

A machine-readable syntax definition of verified_claims is given as JSON schema in [verified_claims.json]. It can be used to automatically validate JSON documents containing a verified_claims element.

5.1. verification Element

This element contains the information about the process conducted to verify a person's identity and bind the respective person data to a user account.

The verification element consists of the following elements:

trust_framework: REQUIRED. String determining the trust framework governing the identity verification process of the OP.

An example value is eidas, which denotes a notified eID system under eIDAS [eIDAS].

identity_assurance_level: OPTIONAL. String determining the identity assurance level associated with the End-User claims in the respective verified_claims. The value range depends on the respective trust_framework value.

For example, the trust framework eidas can have the identity assurance levels low, substantial. and high

For information on predefined trust framework and identity assurance level values see Section 13.

RPs SHOULD ignore verified_claims claims containing a trust framework ID they don't understand.

The trust_framework value determines what further data is provided to the RP in the verification element. A notified eID system under eIDAS, for example, would not need to provide any further data whereas an OP not governed by eIDAS would need to provide verification evidence in order to allow the RP to fulfill its legal obligations. An example of the latter is an OP acting under the German Anti-Money Laundering Law (de_aml).

time: OPTIONAL. Time stamp in ISO 8601:2004 [ISO8601-2004] YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm[:ss]TZD format representing the date and time when the identity verification process took place. This time might deviate from (a potentially also present) id_document/time element since the latter represents the time when a certain evidence was checked whereas this element represents the time when the process was completed. Moreover, the overall verification process and evidence verification can be conducted by different parties (see id_document/verifier). Presence of this element might be required for certain trust frameworks.

verification_process: OPTIONAL. Unique reference to the identity verification process as performed by the OP. Used for backtracing in case of disputes or audits. Presence of this element might be required for certain trust frameworks.

Note: While verification_process refers to the identity verification process at the OP, the txn claim refers to a particular OpenID Connect transaction in which the OP provided the user's verified identity data towards an RP.

evidence: OPTIONAL. JSON array containing information about the evidence the OP used to verify the user's identity as separate JSON objects. Every object contains the property type which determines the type of the evidence. The RP uses this information to process the evidence property appropriately.

Important: Implementations MUST ignore any sub-element not defined in this specification or extensions of this specification.

5.1.1. Evidence

The evidence is generally structured with the following elements:

type: REQUIRED. The value defines the type of the evidence.

attachments: OPTIONAL. Array of JSON objects representing attachments like photocopies of documents or certificates. See Section 5.1.2 on how an attachment is structured.

The following types of evidence are defined:

  • id_document: Verification based on any kind of government issued identity document.

  • utility_bill: Verification based on a utility bill.

  • electronic_signature: Verification based on an electronic signature.

Depending on the evidence type additional elements are defined.

5.1.1.1. id_document

The following elements are contained in an id_document evidence sub-element.

type: REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "id_document".

method: OPTIONAL. The method used to verify the ID document. For information on predefined verification method values see Section 13.

verifier: OPTIONAL. JSON object denoting the legal entity that performed the identity verification on behalf of the OP. This object SHOULD only be included if the OP did not perform the identity verification itself. This object consists of the following properties:

  • organization: REQUIRED. String denoting the organization which performed the verification on behalf of the OP.

  • txn: OPTIONAL. Identifier referring to the identity verification transaction. This transaction identifier can be resolved into transaction details during an audit.

time: OPTIONAL. Time stamp in ISO 8601:2004 [ISO8601-2004] YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm[:ss]TZD format representing the date when this ID document was verified.

document: OPTIONAL. JSON object representing the ID document used to perform the identity verification. It consists of the following properties:

  • type: REQUIRED. String denoting the type of the ID document. For information on predefined identity document values see Section 13. The OP MAY use other than the predefined values in which case the RPs will either be unable to process the assertion, just store this value for audit purposes, or apply bespoken business logic to it.

  • number: OPTIONAL. String representing the number of the identity document.

  • issuer: OPTIONAL. JSON object containing information about the issuer of this identity document. This object consists of the following properties:

    • name: OPTIONAL. Designation of the issuer of the identity document.

    • country: OPTIONAL. String denoting the country or organization that issued the document as ICAO 2-letter code [ICAO-Doc9303], e.g. "JP". ICAO 3-letter codes MAY be used when there is no corresponding ISO 2-letter code, such as "UNO".

  • date_of_issuance: OPTIONAL. The date the document was issued as ISO 8601:2004 YYYY-MM-DD format.

  • date_of_expiry: OPTIONAL. The date the document will expire as ISO 8601:2004 YYYY-MM-DD format.

5.1.1.2. utility_bill

The following elements are contained in a utility_bill evidence sub-element.

type: REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "utility_bill".

provider: OPTIONAL. JSON object identifying the respective provider that issued the bill. The object consists of the following properties:

  • name: REQUIRED. String designating the provider.

  • All elements of the OpenID Connect address Claim ([OpenID])

date: OPTIONAL. String in ISO 8601:2004 YYYY-MM-DD format containing the date when this bill was issued.

5.1.1.3. electronic_signature

The following elements are contained in a electronic_signature evidence sub-element.

type: REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "electronic_signature".

signature_type: REQUIRED. String denoting the type of signature used as evidence. The value range might be restricted by the respective trust framework.

issuer: REQUIRED. String denoting the certification authority that issued the signer's certificate.

serial_number: REQUIRED. String containing the serial number of the certificate used to sign.

created_at: OPTIONAL. The time the signature was created as ISO 8601:2004 YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm[:ss]TZD format.

5.1.2. Attachments

During the identity verification process, specific document artefacts will be created and depending on the trust framework, will be required to be stored for a specific duration. Those artefacts can later be reviewed during audits or quality control for example. Those artefacts include, but are not limited to:

  • scans of filled and signed forms documenting/certifying the verification process itself

  • scans or photocopies of the documents used to verify the identity of end users

  • video recordings of the verification process

  • certificates of electronic signatures

When requested by the RP, those artefacts can be attached to the verified claims response allowing the RP to store those artefacts along with the verified claim information.

An attachment is represented by a JSON object. This specification allows two types of representations:

5.1.2.1. Embedded

All the information of the document (including the content itself) is provided within a JSON object having the following elements:

desc: OPTIONAL. Description of the document. This can be the filename or just an explanation of the content. The used language is not specified, but is usually bound to the jurisdiction of the underlying trust framework of the OP.

content_type: REQUIRED. Content (MIME) type of the document. See [RFC6838]. Multipart or message media types are not allowed. Example: "image/png"

content: REQUIRED. Base64 encoded representation of the document content.

The following example shows embedded attachments. The actual contents of the documents are truncated:

{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework":"eidas_ial_substantial",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "type": "id_document",
          "method": "pipp",
          "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
          "document": {
            "type": "idcard",
            "issuer": {
              "name": "Stadt Augsburg",
              "country": "DE"
            },
            "number": "53554554",
            "date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
            "date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
          },
          "attachments": [
            {
              "desc": "Front of id document",
              "content_type": "image/png",
              "content": "Wkd0bWFtVnlhWFI2Wlc0Mk16VER2RFUyY0RRMWFUbDBNelJ1TlRjd31dzdaM1pTQXJaWGRsTXpNZ2RETmxDZwo="
            },
            {
              "desc": "Back of id document",
              "content_type": "image/png",
              "content": "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAIAAAACCAYAAABytg0kAADSFsjdkhjwhAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Mustermann",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28"
    }
  }
}

Note: Due to their size, embedded attachments are not appropriate when embedding verified claims in access tokens or ID tokens.

5.1.2.2. External

External attachments are similar to distributed claims. The reference to the external document is provided in a JSON object with the following elements:

desc: OPTIONAL. Description of the document. This can be the filename or just an explanation of the content. The used language is not specified, but is usually bound to the jurisdiction of the underlying trust framework or the OP.

url: REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 resource endpoint from which the document can be retrieved. Providers MUST protect this endpoint. The endpoint URL MUST return the document whose cryptographic hash matches the value given in the digest element.

access_token: OPTIONAL. Access Token enabling retrieval of the document from the given url by using the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750] protocol. The document MUST be requested using the Authorization Request header field and Providers MUST support this method. If the Access Token is not available, RPs MUST use the Access Token issued by the OP in the Token Response.

digest: REQUIRED. JSON object representing a cryptographic hash of the document content. The JSON object has the following elements:

  • alg: REQUIRED. Specifies the algorithm used for the calculation of the cryptographic hash. The algorithm has been negotiated previously between RP and OP during Client Registration or Management.

  • value: REQUIRED. Base64 encoded representation of the cryptographic hash.

External attachments are suitable when embedding verified claims in Tokens. However, the verified claims element is not self-contained. The documents need to be retrieved separately, and the digest values MUST be calculated and validated to ensure integrity.

The following example shows external attachments:

{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework":"eidas_ial_substantial",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "type": "id_document",
          "method": "pipp",
          "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
          "document": {
            "type": "idcard",
            "issuer": {
              "name": "Stadt Augsburg",
              "country": "DE"
            },
            "number": "53554554",
            "date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
            "date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
          },
          "attachments": [
            {
              "desc": "Front of id document",
              "digest": {
                "alg": "SHA-256",
                "value": "n4bQgYhMfWWaL+qgxVrQFaO/TxsrC4Is0V1sFbDwCgg="
              },
              "url": "https://example.com/attachments/pGL9yz4hZQ",
              "access_token": "ksj3n283dke"
            },
            {
              "desc": "Back of id document",
              "digest": {
                "alg": "SHA-256",
                "value": "/WGgOvT3fYcPwh4F5+gGeAlcktgIz7O1wnnuBMdKyhM="
              },
              "url": "https://example.com/attachments/4Ag8IpOf95"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Mustermann",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28"
    }
  }
}
5.1.2.3. Privacy Considerations

As attachments will most likely contain more personal information than was requested by the RP with specific claim names, an OP MUST ensure that end users are well aware of when and what kind of attachments are about to be transferred to the RP. If possible or applicable, the OP SHOULD allow the end users to review the content of those attachments before giving consent to the transaction.

5.2. claims Element

The claims element contains the claims about the End-User which were verified by the process and according to the policies determined by the corresponding verification element.

The claims element MAY contain one or more of the following Claims as defined in Section 5.1 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]

  • name

  • given_name

  • middle_name

  • family_name

  • birthdate

  • address

and the claims defined in Section 4.1.

The claims element MAY also contain other claims provided the value of the respective claim was verified in the verification process represented by the sibling verification element.

Claim names MAY be annotated with language tags as specified in Section 5.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].

5.3. verified_claims Delivery

OPs can deliver verified_claims in various ways.

A verified_claims element can be added to an OpenID Connect UserInfo response or an ID Token.

OAuth Authorization Servers can add verified_claims to access tokens in JWT format or Token Introspection responses, either in plain JSON or JWT-protected format.

An OP or AS MAY also include verified_claims in the beforementioned assertions as aggregated or distributed claims (see Section 5.6.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]).

In this case, every assertion provided by the external claims source MUST contain

  • an iss claim identifying the claims source,

  • a sub claim identifying the user in the context of the claim source,

  • a verified_claims element containing one or more verified_claims objects.

Claims sources SHOULD sign the assertions containing verified_claims in order to demonstrate authenticity and provide for non-repudiation. The way an RP determines the key material used for validation of the signed assertions is out of scope. The recommended way is to determine the claims source's public keys by obtaining its JSON Web Key Set via the jwks_uri metadata value read from its openid-configuration metadata document. This document can be discovered using the iss claim of the particular JWT.

The following are examples of assertions including verified claims as aggregated claims

{
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "sub": "248289761001",
  "email": "janedoe@example.com",
  "email_verified": true,
  "_claim_names": {
    "verified_claims": "src1"
  },
  "_claim_sources": {
    "src1": {
      "JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.FArlPUtUVn95HCExePlWJQ6ctVfVpQyeSbe3xkH9MH1QJjnk5GVbBW0qe1b7R3lE-8iVv__0mhRTUI5lcFhLjoGjDS8zgWSarVsEEjwBK7WD3r9cEw6ZAhfEkhHL9eqAaED2rhhDbHD5dZWXkJCuXIcn65g6rryiBanxlXK0ZmcK4fD9HV9MFduk0LRG_p4yocMaFvVkqawat5NV9QQ3ij7UBr3G7A4FojcKEkoJKScdGoozir8m5XD83Sn45_79nCcgWSnCX2QTukL8NywIItu_K48cjHiAGXXSzydDm_ccGCe0sY-Ai2-iFFuQo2PtfuK2SqPPmAZJxEFrFoLY4g"
    }
  }
}

and distributed claims.

{
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "sub": "248289761001",
  "email": "janedoe@example.com",
  "email_verified": true,
  "_claim_names": {
    "verified_claims": "src1"
  },
  "_claim_sources": {
    "src1": {
      "endpoint": "https://server.yetanotherop.com/claim_source",
      "access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
    }
  }
}

An external assertion MAY include (or refer to) multiple verified_claims provided by different external claims sources. To support this use case, this specification extends the syntax as defined in Section 5.6.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]) to also allow references to multiple claims sources as string array.

The following example shows an ID token containing verified_claims from two different external claims sources, one as aggregated and the other as distributed claims.

{
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "sub": "248289761001",
  "email": "janedoe@example.com",
  "email_verified": true,
  "_claim_names": {
    "verified_claims": [
      "src1",
      "src2"
    ]
  },
  "_claim_sources": {
    "src1": {
      "JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.FArlPUtUVn95HCExePlWJQ6ctVfVpQyeSbe3xkH9MH1QJjnk5GVbBW0qe1b7R3lE-8iVv__0mhRTUI5lcFhLjoGjDS8zgWSarVsEEjwBK7WD3r9cEw6ZAhfEkhHL9eqAaED2rhhDbHD5dZWXkJCuXIcn65g6rryiBanxlXK0ZmcK4fD9HV9MFduk0LRG_p4yocMaFvVkqawat5NV9QQ3ij7UBr3G7A4FojcKEkoJKScdGoozir8m5XD83Sn45_79nCcgWSnCX2QTukL8NywIItu_K48cjHiAGXXSzydDm_ccGCe0sY-Ai2-iFFuQo2PtfuK2SqPPmAZJxEFrFoLY4g"
    },
    "src2": {
      "endpoint": "https://server.yetanotherop.com/claim_source",
      "access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
    }
  }
}

The OP MAY combine aggregated and distributed claims with verified_claims provided by itself (see Section 7.7).

If verified_claims elements are contained in multiple places of a response, e.g. in the ID token and an embedded aggregated claim, the RP MUST preserve the claims source as context of the particular verified_claims element.

Note: any assertion provided by an OP or AS including aggregated or distributed claims MAY contain multiple instances of the same End-User claim. It is up to the RP to decide how to process those different instances.

6. Requesting Verified Claims

Making a request for verified claims and related verification data can be explicitly requested on the level of individual data elements by utilizing the claims parameter as defined in Section 5.5 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].

It is also possible to use the scope parameter to request one or more specific pre-defined claim sets as defined in Section 5.4 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].

Note: The OP MUST NOT provide the RP with any data it did not request. However, the OP MAY at its discretion omit claims from the response.

6.1. Requesting End-User Claims

Verified Claims can be requested on the level of individual Claims about the End-User by utilizing the claims parameter as defined in Section 5.5 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].

Note: A machine-readable definition of the syntax to be used to request verified_claims is given as JSON schema in [verified_claims_request.json]. It can be used to automatically validate claims request parameters.

To request verified claims, the verified_claims element is added to the userinfo or the id_token element of the claims parameter.

Since verified_claims contains the effective Claims about the End-User in a nested claims element, the syntax is extended to include expressions on nested elements as follows. The verified_claims element includes a claims element, which in turn includes the desired Claims as keys with a null value. An example is shown in the following:

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

Use of the claims parameter allows the RP to exactly select the Claims about the End-User needed for its use case. This extension therefore allows RPs to fulfill the requirement for data minimization.

RPs MAY indicate that a certain Claim is essential to the successful completion of the user journey by utilizing the essential field as defined in Section 5.5.1 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID]. The following example designates both given name as well as family name as being essential.

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": {
          "essential": true
        },
        "family_name": {
          "essential": true
        },
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

This specification introduces the additional field purpose to allow an RP to state the purpose for the transfer of a certain End-User Claim it is asking for. The field purpose can be a member value of each individually requested Claim, but a Claim cannot have more than one associated purpose.

purpose: OPTIONAL. String describing the purpose for obtaining a certain End-User Claim from the OP. The purpose MUST NOT be shorter than 3 characters or longer than 300 characters. If this rule is violated, the authentication request MUST fail and the OP return an error invalid_request to the RP. The OP MUST display this purpose in the respective user consent screen(s) in order to inform the user about the designated use of the data to be transferred or the authorization to be approved. If the parameter purpose is not present in the request, the OP MAY display a value that was pre-configured for the respective RP. For details on UI localization, see Section 10.

Example:

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": {
          "essential": true,
          "purpose": "To make communication look more personal"
        },
        "family_name": {
          "essential": true
        },
        "birthdate": {
          "purpose": "To send you best wishes on your birthday"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

6.2. Requesting Verification Data

RPs request verification data in the same way they request claims about the end-user. The syntax is based on the rules given in Section 6.1 and extends them for navigation into the structure of the verification element.

Elements within verification are requested by adding the respective element as shown in the following example:

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null,
        "time": null
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

It requests the trust framework the OP complies with and the date of the verification of the user claims.

The RP MUST explicitly request any data it wants the OP to add to the verification element.

Therefore, the RP MUST set fields one step deeper into the structure if it wants to obtain evidence. One or more entries in the evidence array are used as filter criteria and templates for all entries in the result array. The following examples shows a request asking for evidence of type id_document.

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null,
        "time": null,
        "evidence": [
          {
            "type": {
              "value": "id_document"
            },
            "method": null,
            "document": {
              "type": null
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

The example also requests the OP to add the respective method and the document elements (including data about the document type) for every evidence to the resulting verified_claims claim.

A single entry in the evidence array represents a filter over elements of a certain evidence type. The RP therefore MUST specify this type by including the type field including a suitable value sub-element value. The values sub-element MUST NOT be used for the evidence/type field.

If multiple entries are present in evidence, these filters are linked by a logical OR.

The RP MAY also request certain data within the document element to be present. This again follows the syntax rules used above:

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null,
        "time": null,
        "evidence": [
          {
            "type": {
              "value": "id_document"
            },
            "method": null,
            "document": {
              "type": null,
              "issuer": {
                "country": null,
                "name": null
              },
              "number": null,
              "date_of_issuance": null
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

6.2.1. Attachments

RPs can explicitly request to receive attachments along with the verified claims:

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null,
        "attachments": null
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

As with other claims, the attachment claim can be marked as essential in the request as well.

6.2.2. Error Handling

The OP has the discretion to decide whether the requested verification data is to be provided to the RP. An OP MUST NOT return an error in case it cannot return a requested verification data, even if it was marked as essential, regardless of the data being unavailable or the End-User not authorizing its release.

6.3. Defining further constraints on Verification Data

6.3.1. value/values

The RP MAY limit the possible values of the elements trust_framework, evidence/method, and evidence/document/type by utilizing the value or values fields and the element evidence/type by utilizing the value field.

Note: Examples on the usage of a restriction on evidence/type were given in the previous section.

The following example shows how an RP may request claims either complying with trust framework gold or silver.

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": {
          "values": [
            "silver",
            "bronze"
          ]
        }
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null
      }
    }
  }
}

The following example shows that the RP wants to obtain an attestation based on the German Anti Money Laundering Law (trust framework de_aml) and limited to users who were identified in a bank branch in person (physical in person proofing - method pipp) using either an idcard or a passport.

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": {
          "value": "de_aml"
        },
        "evidence": [
          {
            "type": {
              "value": "id_document"
            },
            "method": {
              "value": "pipp"
            },
            "document": {
              "type": {
                "values": [
                  "idcard",
                  "passport"
                ]
              }
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

In case the RP limits the possible values of any of the aforementioned four elements and the OP does not understand/support some or all of them (i.e. their values are not listed under its OP metadata) or they are not applicable/fulfillable for a certain user, the OP MUST NOT return an error, but instead not deliver at all the verified_claims claim.

The OP MUST NOT ignore some or all of the query restrictions on possible values and deliver available verified/verification data that does not match these constraints.

6.3.2. max_age

The RP MAY also express a requirement regarding the age of certain data, like the time elapsed since the issuance/expiry of certain evidence types or since the verification process asserted in the verification element took place. Section 5.5.1 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID] defines a query syntax that allows for new special query members to be defined. This specification introduces a new such member max_age, which is applicable to the possible values of any elements containing dates or timestamps (e.g. time, date_of_issuance and date_of_expiry elements of evidence of type id_document or element date of evidence of type utility_bill).

max_age: OPTIONAL. JSON number value only applicable to Claims that contain dates or timestamps. It defines the maximum time (in seconds) to be allowed to elapse since the value of the date/timestamp up to the point in time of the request. The OP should make the calculation of elapsed time starting from the last valid second of the date value.

The following is an example of a request for Claims where the verification process of the data is not allowed to be older than 63113852 seconds:

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": {
          "value": "jp_aml"
        },
        "time": {
          "max_age": 63113852
        }
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

The OP SHOULD try to fulfill this requirement. If the verification data of the user is older than the requested max_age, the OP MAY attempt to refresh the user's verification by sending them through an online identity verification process, e.g. by utilizing an electronic ID card or a video identification approach. If the OP is unable to fulfill the max_age constraint it MUST NOT deliver the verified_claims claim at all.

6.3.3. Requesting claims sets with different verification requirements

It is also possible to request different trust frameworks, identity assurance levels, and verification methods for different claim sets. This requires the RP to send an array of verified_claims objects instead of passing a single object.

The following example illustrates this functionality.

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": [
      {
        "verification": {
          "trust_framework": {
            "value": "eidas"
          },
          "identity_assurance_level": {
            "value": "high"
          }
        },
        "claims": {
          "given_name": null,
          "family_name": null
        }
      },
      {
        "verification": {
          "trust_framework": {
            "value": "eidas"
          },
          "identity_assurance_level":{
            "values":[
              "high",
              "substantial"
            ]
          }
        },
        "claims": {
          "birthdate": null
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

When the RP requests multiple verifications as described above, the OP is supposed to process any element in the array independently. The OP will provide verified_claims response elements for every verified_claims request element whose requirements it is able to fulfill. This also means if multiple verified_claims elements contain the same end-user claim(s), the OP delivers the claim in as many verified claims response objects it can fulfil. For example, if the trust framework the OP uses is compatible with multiple of the requested trust frameworks, it provides a verified claims elements for each of them.

The RP MAY combine multiple verified_claims claims in the request with multiple trust_framework and/or identity_assurance_level values using the values element. In that case, the rules given above for processing values are applied for the particular verified_claims request object.

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": [
      {
        "verification": {
          "trust_framework": {
            "value": "gold"
          },
          "evidence": [
            {
              "type": {
                "value": "id_document"
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "claims": {
          "given_name": null,
          "family_name": null
        }
      },
      {
        "verification": {
          "trust_framework": {
            "values": [
              "silver",
              "bronze"
            ]
          },
          "evidence": [
            {
              "type": {
                "value": "utility_bill"
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "claims": {
          "given_name": null,
          "family_name": null
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

In the above example, the RP asks for family and given name either under trust framework gold with an evidence of type id_document or under trust framework silver or bronze but with an evidence utility_bill.

6.3.4. Error Handling

If the claims sub-element is empty, the OP MUST abort the transaction with an invalid_request error.

Claims unknown to the OP or not available as verified claims MUST be ignored and omitted from the response. If the resulting claims sub-element is empty, the OP MUST omit the verified_claims element.

6.4. Requesting sets of claims by scope

Verified Claims about the End-User can be requested as part of a pre-defined set by utilizing the scope parameter as defined in Section 5.4 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].

When using this approach the claims associated with a scope are administratively defined at the OP. The OP configuration and RP request parameters will determine whether the claims are returned via the ID Token or UserInfo endpoint as defined in Section 5.3.2 of the OpenID Connect specification [OpenID].

7. Examples

The following sections show examples of responses containing verified_claims.

The first and second sections show JSON snippets of the general identity assurance case, where the RP is provided with verification evidence for different verification methods along with the actual Claims about the End-User.

The third section illustrates how the contents of this object could look like in case of a notified eID system under eIDAS, where the OP does not need to provide evidence of the identity verification process to the RP.

Subsequent sections contain examples for using the verified_claims Claim on different channels and in combination with other (unverified) Claims.

7.1. id_document

{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "de_aml",
      "time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
      "verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "type": "id_document",
          "method": "pipp",
          "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
          "document": {
            "type": "idcard",
            "issuer": {
              "name": "Stadt Augsburg",
              "country": "DE"
            },
            "number": "53554554",
            "date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
            "date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28",
      "place_of_birth": {
        "country": "DE",
        "locality": "Musterstadt"
      },
      "nationalities": [
        "DE"
      ],
      "address": {
        "locality": "Maxstadt",
        "postal_code": "12344",
        "country": "DE",
        "street_address": "An der Weide 22"
      }
    }
  }
}

7.2. id_document + utility bill

{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "de_aml",
      "time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
      "verification_process": "513645-e44b-4951-942c-7091cf7d891d",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "type": "id_document",
          "method": "pipp",
          "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
          "document": {
            "type": "de_erp_replacement_idcard",
            "issuer": {
              "name": "Stadt Augsburg",
              "country": "DE"
            },
            "number": "53554554",
            "date_of_issuance": "2010-04-23",
            "date_of_expiry": "2020-04-22"
          }
        },
        {
          "type": "utility_bill",
          "provider": {
            "name": "Stadtwerke Musterstadt",
            "country": "DE",
            "region": "Niedersachsen",
            "street_address": "Energiestrasse 33"
          },
          "date": "2013-01-31"
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28",
      "place_of_birth": {
        "country": "DE",
        "locality": "Musterstadt"
      },
      "nationalities": [
        "DE"
      ],
      "address": {
        "locality": "Maxstadt",
        "postal_code": "12344",
        "country": "DE",
        "street_address": "An der Weide 22"
      }
    }
  }
}

7.3. Notified eID system (eIDAS)

{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "eidas_ial_substantial"
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28",
      "place_of_birth": {
        "country": "DE",
        "locality": "Musterstadt"
      },
      "nationalities": [
        "DE"
      ]
    }
  }
}

7.4. Multiple Verified Claims

{
  "verified_claims": [
    {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": "eidas",
        "identity_assurance_level": "substantial"
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": "Max",
        "family_name": "Meier",
        "birthdate": "1956-01-28",
        "place_of_birth": {
          "country": "DE",
          "locality": "Musterstadt"
        },
        "nationalities": [
          "DE"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": "de_aml",
        "time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
        "verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
        "evidence": [
          {
            "type": "id_document",
            "method": "pipp",
            "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
            "document": {
              "type": "idcard"
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "claims": {
        "address": {
          "locality": "Maxstadt",
          "postal_code": "12344",
          "country": "DE",
          "street_address": "An der Weide 22"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

7.5. Verified Claims in UserInfo Response

7.5.1. Request

In this example we assume the RP uses the scope parameter to request the email address and, additionally, the claims parameter, to request verified Claims.

The scope value is: scope=openid email

The value of the claims parameter is:

{
  "userinfo": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

7.5.2. UserInfo Response

The respective UserInfo response would be

{
  "sub": "248289761001",
  "email": "janedoe@example.com",
  "email_verified": true,
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "de_aml"
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28"
    }
  }
}

7.6. Verified Claims in ID Tokens

7.6.1. Request

In this case, the RP requests verified Claims along with other Claims about the End-User in the claims parameter and allocates the response to the ID Token (delivered from the token endpoint in case of grant type authorization_code).

The claims parameter value is

{
  "id_token": {
    "email": null,
    "preferred_username": null,
    "picture": null,
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": null,
        "time": null,
        "verification_process": null,
        "evidence": [
          {
            "type": {
              "value": "id_document"
            },
            "method": null,
            "time": null,
            "document": {
              "type": null,
              "issuer": {
                "name": null,
                "country": null
              },
              "number": null,
              "date_of_issuance": null,
              "date_of_expiry": null
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": null,
        "family_name": null,
        "birthdate": null
      }
    }
  }
}

7.6.2. ID Token

The respective ID Token could be

{
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "sub": "24400320",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
  "exp": 1311281970,
  "iat": 1311280970,
  "auth_time": 1311280969,
  "acr": "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver",
  "email": "janedoe@example.com",
  "preferred_username": "j.doe",
  "picture": "http://example.com/janedoe/me.jpg",
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "de_aml",
      "time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
      "verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "type": "id_document",
          "method": "pipp",
          "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
          "document": {
            "type": "idcard",
            "issuer": {
              "name": "Stadt Augsburg",
              "country": "DE"
            },
            "number": "53554554",
            "date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
            "date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28"
    }
  }
}

7.7. Claims provided by the OP and external sources

This example shows how an OP can mix own claims and claims provided by
external sources in a single ID token.

{
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "sub": "248289761001",
  "email": "janedoe@example.com",
  "email_verified": true,
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "ial_example_gold"
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier"
    }
  },
  "_claim_names": {
    "verified_claims": [
      "src1",
      "src2"
    ]
  },
  "_claim_sources": {
    "src1": {
      "JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.FArlPUtUVn95HCExePlWJQ6ctVfVpQyeSbe3xkH9MH1QJjnk5GVbBW0qe1b7R3lE-8iVv__0mhRTUI5lcFhLjoGjDS8zgWSarVsEEjwBK7WD3r9cEw6ZAhfEkhHL9eqAaED2rhhDbHD5dZWXkJCuXIcn65g6rryiBanxlXK0ZmcK4fD9HV9MFduk0LRG_p4yocMaFvVkqawat5NV9QQ3ij7UBr3G7A4FojcKEkoJKScdGoozir8m5XD83Sn45_79nCcgWSnCX2QTukL8NywIItu_K48cjHiAGXXSzydDm_ccGCe0sY-Ai2-iFFuQo2PtfuK2SqPPmAZJxEFrFoLY4g"
    },
    "src2": {
      "endpoint": "https://server.yetanotherop.com/claim_source",
      "access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
    }
  }
}

7.8. Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider and External Claims

This example shows how a Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider (SIOP) may include verified claims obtained from different external claim sources into a ID Token.

{
  "iss": "https://self-issued.me",
  "sub": "248289761001",
  "preferred_username": "superman445",
  "_claim_names": {
    "verified_claims": [
      "src1",
      "src2"
    ]
  },
  "_claim_sources": {
    "src1": {
      "JWT": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5vdGhlcm9wLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6ImU4MTQ4NjAzLTg5MzQtNDI0NS04MjViLWMxMDhiOGI2Yjk0NSIsInZlcmlmaWVkX2NsYWltcyI6eyJ2ZXJpZmljYXRpb24iOnsidHJ1c3RfZnJhbWV3b3JrIjoiaWFsX2V4YW1wbGVfZ29sZCJ9LCJjbGFpbXMiOnsiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6Ik1heCIsImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIjoiTWVpZXIiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTU2LTAxLTI4In19fQ.FArlPUtUVn95HCExePlWJQ6ctVfVpQyeSbe3xkH9MH1QJjnk5GVbBW0qe1b7R3lE-8iVv__0mhRTUI5lcFhLjoGjDS8zgWSarVsEEjwBK7WD3r9cEw6ZAhfEkhHL9eqAaED2rhhDbHD5dZWXkJCuXIcn65g6rryiBanxlXK0ZmcK4fD9HV9MFduk0LRG_p4yocMaFvVkqawat5NV9QQ3ij7UBr3G7A4FojcKEkoJKScdGoozir8m5XD83Sn45_79nCcgWSnCX2QTukL8NywIItu_K48cjHiAGXXSzydDm_ccGCe0sY-Ai2-iFFuQo2PtfuK2SqPPmAZJxEFrFoLY4g"
    },
    "src2": {
      "endpoint": "https://op.mymno.com/claim_source",
      "access_token": "ksj3n283dkeafb76cdef"
    }
  }
}

8. OP Metadata

The OP advertises its capabilities with respect to verified Claims in its openid-configuration (see [OpenID-Discovery]) using the following new elements:

verified_claims_supported: Boolean value indicating support for verified_claims, i.e. the OpenID Connect for Identity Assurance extension.

trust_frameworks_supported: JSON array containing all supported trust frameworks.

evidence_supported: JSON array containing all types of identity evidence the OP uses.

id_documents_supported: JSON array containing all identity documents utilized by the OP for identity verification.

id_documents_verification_methods_supported: JSON array containing the ID document verification methods the OP supports as defined in Section 5.1.

claims_in_verified_claims_supported: JSON array containing all claims supported within verified_claims.

attachments_supported: JSON array containing all attachment types supported by the OP. Possible values are external and embedded. If the list is empty, the OP does not support attachments.

digest_algorithms_supported: JSON array containing all supported digest algorithms which can be used as alg property within the digest object of external attachments. If the OP supports external attachments, at least the algorithm sha-256 MUST be supported by the OP as well. The list of possible digest/hash algorithm names is maintained by IANA in [hash_name_registry] (established by [RFC6920]).

This is an example openid-configuration snippet:

{
...
   "verified_claims_supported":true,
   "trust_frameworks_supported":[
     "nist_800_63A_3"
   ],
   "evidence_supported": [
      "id_document",
      "utility_bill",
      "electronic_signature"
   ],
   "id_documents_supported": [
       "idcard",
       "passport",
       "driving_permit"
   ],
   "id_documents_verification_methods_supported": [
       "pipp",
       "sripp",
       "eid"
   ],
   "claims_in_verified_claims_supported": [
      "given_name",
      "family_name",
      "birthdate",
      "place_of_birth",
      "nationalities",
      "address"
   ],
  "attachments_supported": [
    "external",
    "embedded"
  ],
  "digest_algorithms_supported": [
    "sha-256"
  ],
...
}

The OP MUST support the claims parameter and needs to publish this in its openid-configuration using the claims_parameter_supported element.

9. Client Registration and Management

During Client Registration (see [OpenID-Registration]) as well as during Client Management [RFC7592] the following additional properties are available:

digest_algorithm: String value representing the chosen digest algorithm (for external attachments). The value MUST be one of the digest algorithms supported by the OP as advertised in the OP metadata. If this property is not set, sha-256 will be used by default.

10. Transaction-specific Purpose

This specification introduces the request parameter purpose to allow an RP to state the purpose for the transfer of user data it is asking for.

purpose: OPTIONAL. String describing the purpose for obtaining certain user data from the OP. The purpose MUST NOT be shorter than 3 characters and MUST NOT be longer than 300 characters. If these rules are violated, the authentication request MUST fail and the OP returns an error invalid_request to the RP.

The OP MUST display this purpose in the respective user consent screen(s) in order to inform the user about the designated use of the data to be transferred or the authorization to be approved.

In order to ensure a consistent UX, the RP MAY send the purpose in a certain language and request the OP to use the same language using the ui_locales parameter.

If the parameter purpose is not present in the request, the OP MAY utilize a description that was pre-configured for the respective RP.

Note: In order to prevent injection attacks, the OP MUST escape the text appropriately before it will be shown in a user interface. The OP MUST expect special characters in the URL decoded purpose text provided by the RP. The OP MUST ensure that any special characters in the purpose text cannot be used to inject code into the web interface of the OP (e.g., cross-site scripting, defacing). Proper escaping MUST be applied by the OP. The OP SHALL NOT remove characters from the purpose text to this end.

11. Privacy Consideration

Timestamps with a time zone component can potentially reveal the person's location. To preserve the person's privacy timestamps within the verification element and verified claims that represent times SHOULD be represented in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), unless there is a specific reason to include the time zone, such as the time zone being an essential part of a consented time related claim in verified data.

The use of scopes is a potential shortcut to request a pre-defined set of claims, however, the use of scopes might result in more data being returned to the RP than is strictly necessary and not achieving the goal of data minimisation. The RP SHOULD only request end-user claims and metadata it requires.

12. Security Considerations

This specification focuses on mechanisms to carry End-User claims and accompanying metadata in JSON objects and JSON web tokens, typically as part of an OpenID Connect protocol exchange. Since such an exchange is supposed to take place in security sensitive use cases, implementers MUST combine this specification with an appropriate security profile for OpenID Connect.

This specification does not define or require a particular security profile since there are several security profiles and new security profiles under developmewnt. Implementers shall be given flexibility to select the security profile that best suits their needs. Implementers might consider [FAPI-1-RW] or [FAPI-2-BL].

Implementers are recommended to select a security profile that has a certification program or other resources that allow both OpenID Providers and Relying Parties to ensure they have complied with the profile's security and interoperability requirements, such as the OpenID Foundation Certification Program, https://openid.net/certification/.

The integrity and authenticity of the issued assertions MUST be ensured in order to prevent identity spoofing.

The confidentiality of all user data exchanged between the protocol parties MUST be ensured using suitable methods at transport or application layer.

13. Predefined Values

This specification focuses on the technical mechanisms to convey verified claims and thus does not define any identifiers for trust frameworks, id documents, or verification methods. This is left to adopters of the technical specification, e.g. implementers, identity schemes, or jurisdictions.

Each party defining such identifiers MUST ensure the collision resistance of those identifiers. This is achieved by including a domain name under the control of this party into the identifier name, e.g. https://mycompany.com/identifiers/cool_verification_method.

The eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group maintains a wiki page [predefined_values_page] that can be utilized to share predefined values with other parties.

14. Normative References

[RFC8417]
Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
[verified_claims.json]
OpenID Foundation, "JSON Schema for assertions using verified_claims", , <https://openid.net/schemas/verified_claims-11.json>.
[OpenID-Registration]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[OpenID]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", , <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[ISO3166-1]
ISO, "ISO 3166-1:1997. Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions -- Part 1: Country codes", , <https://www.iso.org/standard/63545.html>.
[ICAO-Doc9303]
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, "Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015, Part 3: Specifications Common to all MRTDs", , <https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p3_cons_en.pdf>.
[E.164]
ITU-T, "Recommendation ITU-T E.164", , <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.164/en>.
[RFC6838]
Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC6750]
Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[verified_claims_request.json]
OpenID Foundation, "JSON Schema for requesting verified_claims", , <https://openid.net/schemas/verified_claims_request-11.json>.
[hash_name_registry]
IANA, "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/>.
[ISO3166-3]
ISO, "ISO 3166-1:2013. Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions -- Part 3: Code for formerly used names of countries", , <https://www.iso.org/standard/63547.html>.
[OpenID-Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., de Medeiros, B., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.
[predefined_values_page]
OpenID Foundation, "Overview page for predefined values", , <https://openid.net/wg/ekyc-ida/identifiers/>.

15. Informative References

[FATF-Digital-Identity]
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), "Guidance on Digital Identity", , <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-on-Digital-Identity.pdf>.
[RFC7592]
Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., and M. Machulak, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol", RFC 7592, DOI 10.17487/RFC7592, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7592>.
[NIST-SP-800-63a]
Grassi, Paul. A., Fentony, James L., Lefkovitz, Naomi B., Danker, Jamie M., Choong, Yee-Yin., Greene, Kristen K., and Mary F. Theofanos, "NIST Special Publication 800-63A, Digital Identity Guidelines, Enrollment and Identity Proofing Requirements", , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63a>.
[eIDAS]
European Parliament, "REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC", , <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0910>.
[FAPI-2-BL]
OpenID Foundation's Financial API (FAPI) Working Group, "FAPI 2.0 Baseline Profile", , <https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/src/master/FAPI_2_0_Baseline_Profile.md>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response]
Lodderstedt, T. and V. Dzhuvinov, "JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-10, , <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-10>.
[FAPI-1-RW]
OpenID Foundation's Financial API (FAPI) Working Group, "Financial-grade API - Part 2: Read and Write API Security Profile", , <https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/src/master/Financial_API_WD_002.md>.
[RFC7662]
Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC6920]
Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B., Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with Hashes", RFC 6920, DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920>.

Appendix A. IANA Considerations

A.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims Registry" established by [RFC7519].

A.1.1. Registry Contents

Claim Name:

verified_claims

Claim Description:

This container claim is composed of the verification evidence related to a certain verification process and the corresponding Claims about the End-User which were verified in this process.

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Verified Claims of this document

Claim Name:

place_of_birth

Claim Description:

A structured Claim representing the End-User's place of birth.

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

nationalities

Claim Description:

String array representing the user's nationalities.

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

birth_family_name

Claim Description:

Family name(s) someone has when they were born, or at least from the time they were a child. This term can be used by a person who changes the family name(s) later in life for any reason. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple family names or no family name; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

birth_given_name

Claim Description:

Given name(s) someone has when they were born, or at least from the time they were a child. This term can be used by a person who changes the given name later in life for any reason. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple given names; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

birth_middle_name

Claim Description:

Middle name(s) someone has when they were born, or at least from the time they were a child. This term can be used by a person who changes the middle name later in life for any reason. Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple middle names; all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters. Also note that in some cultures, middle names are not used.

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

salutation

Claim Description:

End-User's salutation, e.g. "Mr."

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

title

Claim Description:

End-User's title, e.g. "Dr."

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

msisdn

Claim Description:

End-User's mobile phone numer formated according to ITU-T recommendation [E.164], e.g. "+1999550123"

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Claim Name:

also_known_as

Claim Description:

Stage name, religious name or any other type of alias/pseudonym with which a person is known in a specific context besides its legal name. This must be part of the applicable legislation and thus the trust framework (e.g., be an attribute on the identity card).

Change Controller:

eKYC and Identity Assurance Working Group - openid-specs-ekyc-ida@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Section Claims of this document

Appendix B. Acknowledgements

The following people at yes.com and partner companies contributed to the concept described in the initial contribution to this specification: Karsten Buch, Lukas Stiebig, Sven Manz, Waldemar Zimpfer, Willi Wiedergold, Fabian Hoffmann, Daniel Keijsers, Ralf Wagner, Sebastian Ebling, Peter Eisenhofer.

We would like to thank Julian White, Bjorn Hjelm, Stephane Mouy, Alberto Pulido, Joseph Heenan, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Kosuke Koiwai, Azusa Kikuchi, Naohiro Fujie, Takahiko Kawasaki, Sebastian Ebling, Marcos Sanz, Tom Jones, Mike Pegman, Michael B. Jones, Jeff Lombardo, Taylor Ongaro, and Mark Haine for their valuable feedback and contributions that helped to evolve this specification.

Appendix C. Notices

Copyright (c) 2020 The OpenID Foundation.

The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.

The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

Appendix D. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

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-00 (WG document)

Authors' Addresses

Torsten Lodderstedt
yes.com
Daniel Fett
yes.com
Mark Haine
Considrd.Consulting Ltd
Alberto Pulido
Santander
Kai Lehmann
1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH
Kosuke Koiwai
KDDI Corporation